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LEGISLATING IN THE SHADOWS

CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER†
Federal agencies are deeply involved in both the foreground and shadows of
legislative drafting. In the foreground, agencies draft the substantive legislation the
Administration desires to submit to Congress. In the shadows, agencies provide
confidential “technical drafting assistance” on legislation that originates with
congressional staffers. This technical drafting assistance provides Congress with
agency expertise on the subject matter, which helps Congress avoid considering
legislation that would unnecessarily disrupt the current statutory scheme. It also
allows the agency to play an active—yet opaque—role in drafting legislation from
the very early stages. In fact, the empirical findings presented in this Article, based
on extensive interviews and surveys at some twenty federal agencies, suggest that
agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of proposed
legislation that directly affects them and on most legislation that gets enacted.
The underexplored yet widespread practice of legislating in the shadows has
important implications for administrative law theory and doctrine, as well as the
conventional principal–agent bureaucratic model. On one hand, this phenomenon
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perhaps supports the growing scholarly call that agencies should be allowed to engage
in more purposivist interpretation (than their judicial counterparts) because of their
expertise in legislative history and purpose as well as their role in statutory drafting.
On the other, this phenomenon may cast some doubt on the foundations for judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretations. Agencies are usually intimately involved
in drafting legislation that ultimately delegates—to themselves—the authority to interpret
that very legislation. In other words, many of the criticisms of agency self-delegation
raised against Auer deference could apply with some force to Chevron deference as
well. At the very least, scholars should consider more closely the administrative state’s
role in drafting legislation—especially drafting legislation in the shadows—when
evaluating the level of deference courts should give to agency statutory interpretations.
Such reconsideration is particularly warranted given the lack of transparency implicated
by legislating in the shadows.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal agencies help draft statutes. They are involved in the foreground
of the legislative process when, in coordination with the White House, they
propose substantive legislation to Congress that advances agency and
Administration objectives, and when they weigh in substantively with agency
and Administration policy positions on pending legislation. Federal agencies
also help draft statutes in the background by providing “technical drafting
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assistance” on legislation that originates from congressional staffers. Such
drafting assistance is often provided confidentially—without White House
oversight, much less public notice and comment—and continues to be
provided throughout the legislative process. By sharing their subject matter
expertise, the agency conducts technical drafting assistance that helps Congress
avoid pursuing legislation that would unnecessarily disrupt the current
statutory and regulatory scheme. But it also allows the agency to play an active,
nonpublic role in drafting legislation from the very early stages.
In fact, the empirical findings presented in this Article, based on extensive
interviews and surveys at some twenty federal agencies, suggest that agencies
provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of the proposed
legislation that directly affects them and on most legislation that gets
enacted.1 It turns out that the vast majority of legislative drafting conducted
by federal agencies today is not agency-initiated substantive legislation,
but “legislating in the shadows” through confidential agency responses to
congressional requests for technical drafting assistance.
This underexplored but widespread practice of legislating in the shadows
is yet another departure from the “lost world of administrative law,” further
revealing “an increasing mismatch between the suppositions of modern
administrative law and the realities of modern regulation.”2 This phenomenon
also complicates the bureaucratic principal–agent model that positive political
theorists have developed over decades,3 especially in the context of agency
statutory interpretation and judicial review thereof.4
1 Many findings discussed in this Article were first reported by the author in an independent
report commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). See generally
Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: Technical Assistance in Statutory
Drafting, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826146 [https://perma.cc/V3B688J4] [hereinafter Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process]. See also Adoption of
Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161 (Dec. 16, 2015) (summarizing ACUS’s findings and
recommending that federal agencies should “endeavor to provide Congress with technical drafting
assistance when asked”).
2 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014).
3 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 765-72
(1984) (applying principal–agent theory to the administrative state and detailing asymmetries and
other complications); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) (“The basic
principal-agent dilemma, of which legislative delegation is a subspecies, involves a tradeoff between
the principal’s desire to exploit the agent’s informational advantages and the principal’s concern that
the agent will pursue divergent goals.”). See generally Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of
Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005) (reviewing political science literature on
the evolution of the principal–agency theory regarding the administrative state).
4 For a literature review of the application of positive political theory to agency statutory
interpretation, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
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After Part I of the Article presents the findings from the study based on
interviews and surveys of agency officials, Part II focuses on two implications
of legislating in the shadows for administrative law theory and doctrine.
First, this phenomenon generally lends support to the growing scholarly
call that agencies should be allowed to engage in more purposivist interpretation
(than their judicial counterparts) because of their expertise in legislative
history and their substantial role in statutory drafting.5 In other words,
agencies’ extensive involvement in the legislative process—often from the
very outset and then through enactment—better equips those same agencies
to understand the purpose of the legislation than the more generalist federal
courts. Thus, agencies should have more flexibility to take into account such
statutory purpose.
Second, and conversely, legislating in the shadows may cast further doubt
on the foundations for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations.
As the findings in this Article underscore, agencies are intimately involved in
drafting legislation that ultimately delegates the authority to interpret that
legislation to the same agencies. It might therefore be more appropriate to
set the interpretive presumption against Chevron deference6 and, instead,
accord only Skidmore weight based on the agency’s “power to persuade.”7 After
all, many of the agency self-delegation criticisms raised against Auer deference8
could apply with some force to agency statutory interpretation and Chevron
deference as well. Concerns of “administrative collusion” are amplified when
one considers the agency’s substantial role in providing confidential technical

O’Connell eds., 2010). To be sure, the bureaucratic principal–agent model was already complex. For
instance, federal agencies have at least two principals, namely Congress and the President. See, e.g.,
Miller, supra note 3, at 211-12 (discussing Congress and the President as “jealous” principals in the
context of the principal–agent model); Moe, supra note 3, at 768-69 (noting that agencies have
multiple principals because they are overseen by both the President and congressional committees).
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that even this dual-principal model is overly simplistic. See,
e.g., Brigham Daniels, Agency As Principal, 48 GA. L. REV. 335, 341 (2014) (noting that the relationship
between “administrative agencies and the elected branches . . . is a good deal more complicated than the
conventional understanding assumes”); Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes
the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1491-1501 (2015) (arguing that the dominant notion of
Congress delegating power to the executive is complicated by the concept of the “collective Congress”).
5 See infra Section II.A (reviewing the relevant literature).
6 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (instructing
courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers).
7 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
8 See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing Auer deference because “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages
the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases”);
see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (asserting that an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’”).
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drafting assistance.9 This additional concern over agency self-dealing may be
the last straw for Chevron’s demise in light of the constitutional, normative,
and administrability concerns already being discussed in the literature, on
Capitol Hill, and at the Supreme Court.10 At the very least, this phenomenon
could lend further support for Chief Justice Roberts’s narrower, context-specific
approach to Chevron deference as articulated in his dissent in City of Arlington
v. FCC11 and his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.12
In light of the current practice of legislating in the shadows, open-government
concerns might heighten the need to revisit judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation. After all, transparency is a core value in administrative law.
Yet, as documented in Part I, the provision of agency technical drafting assistance
generally takes place in secret, often before the bill is even introduced, and
with an expectation that the congressional request and agency response will
remain confidential. Indeed, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
does not require preclearance of technical drafting assistance, and OMB is
seldom kept in the loop (though the political appointees in the agency’s
legislative affairs office are almost always involved in the process). To advance
administrative law’s critical values of public transparency and open governance,
one could argue that the technical drafting assistance process should take place
in the sunshine—just like most other agency actions. As discussed in Part III,
however, the costs of such transparency are arguably too great. Such
transparency would likely discourage Congress from even consulting with
agency experts at an early stage in the legislative process, when the legislation
is more easily reworked and thus where input from agency subject matter
experts is most valuable.
Instead, this Article concludes that the better solution to address these
transparency concerns may be to rework the level of deference under which
courts review agency statutory interpretations. Put differently, since agencies
help legislate in the shadows, perhaps the grand compromise needed to
recalibrate the modern administrative state is for courts to allow agencies to
continue to provide technical drafting assistance to Congress and engage in
9 See Rao, supra note 4, at 1504 (“By fracturing the collective Congress and empowering
individual members, delegation also promotes collusion between members of Congress and
administrative agencies.”).
10 See infra Section II.B (reviewing relevant literature on criticisms of the Chevron doctrine).
11 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880-81 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that when determining “whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority
over the statutory ambiguity at issue,” the Court should “ask[] whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed]
authority to the agency to elucidate [the] specific provision of the statute by regulation’”).
12 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“Whether those credits are available on
Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic and political significance that is central to
this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would
have done so expressly.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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more purposivist statutory interpretation, yet to review such interpretations
without the highly deferential Chevron standard. Or, at least, for courts to
only apply Chevron deference—as the Chief Justice would prefer—when the
reviewing court is satisfied that Congress as a whole intended to delegate to
the agency interpretive authority regarding the particular statutory provision.
Such technical drafting assistance would continue to take place in the shadows
to encourage congressional drafters to leverage agency expertise, but agencies
would have fewer incentives for self-dealing in the absence of highly deferential
judicial review of subsequent agency statutory interpretations.
I. STUDY OF AGENCY TECHNICAL DRAFTING ASSISTANCE
A. Background and Relevant Literature
Despite the administrative state’s substantial role in the legislative process,
we know very little about how agencies actually interact with Congress in the
legislative process. We have barely begun to incorporate empirical realities into
our theories of agency statutory interpretation and administrative governance.13
To be sure, many have recognized over the years that the administrative state
plays an expansive role in drafting legislation.14 For instance, Justice Felix
13 Studies by Jarrod Shobe and Ganesh Sitaraman are two notable and recent exceptions. In 2014,
Shobe conducted a fifty-five-question survey of fifty-four agency staffers involved in legislative matters
at fourteen executive departments and eleven independent agencies. Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As
Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
451, 460-67 (2017). The Shobe study explored the role of federal agencies in the legislative process,
including some exploration of their role in providing technical drafting assistance. Id. at 467-82.
Similarly, the Sitaraman article details the legislative process generally—including some discussion
of the role of federal agencies in providing substantive and technical drafting assistance. Ganesh Sitaraman,
The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 124-43 (2015). His article is “derived in part
from [his] experiences serving as senior counsel to Senator Elizabeth Warren.” Id. at 79 n.*.
14 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221 (2012) (noting that
“Congress often depended upon the departments to draft major legislation” in the 1800s, and even
the legislation creating the Department of the Interior was drafted by Treasury at the request of the
Ways and Means Committee); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 582
(2009) (discussing agency involvement in drafting legislation, how an agency shares its interpretation
with legislative staff, and how Congress relies on agencies when enacting legislation); Robert A.
Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 656-61 (2012) (discussing the role of
federal agencies in the legislative process and asserting that “[a]gency sensitivity to Congress’s
workways reflects an often-intimate involvement in the legislative process”); Nicholas R. Parrillo,
Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative
History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 340-41 (2013) (discussing the role of federal agencies in
preparing bills, appearing at committee hearings, and helping to develop bills’ legislative histories);
Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347-49 (1990)
[hereinafter Strauss, Agency Interpretation] (discussing the significance of an agency’s relationship to
Congress in understanding legislative histories).
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Frankfurter observed back in 1942 that “[f]rom the very beginning of our
government in 1789, federal legislation like that now under review has usually
not only been sponsored but actually drafted by the appropriate executive
agency.”15 In 1961, James Craig Peacock echoed Justice Frankfurter’s observation:
For it cannot be overlooked that, in Washington, at least, the extent to which
the spade work in the actual drafting of important legislation has been shifted
all the way back to the agency level, is a major phenomenon of present day
government . . . . Indeed, the executive branch of the Government is no
longer even expected to confine itself to the mere making of recommendations
or proposals. It is practically expected to implement them in the form of
already drafted bills.16

In other words, “[b]ecause agencies have day-to-day experience with the legal,
political, and operational aspects of the laws,” as Clinton Brass of the
Congressional Research Service has explained, “[i]t is not surprising that a
fair proportion of the legislation that is considered in the legislative process
tends to have been drafted or influenced at some point by executive branch
employees, including both career civil servants and political appointees.”17
Recent empirical work has provided additional insight into the role of
federal agencies in the legislative process. For instance, Lisa Bressman and
Abbe Gluck have surveyed over one hundred congressional staffers and
reported that “25% and 34% of our respondents told us that first drafts are
typically written by, respectively, the White House and agencies, or policy
experts and outside groups, like lobbyists”; however, “[e]mpirical work is
lacking for the details of this account . . . .”18 In another article, the author
15 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 177 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16 JAMES CRAIG PEACOCK, NOTES ON LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 2-3 (1961); accord DONALD
HIRSCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFTING FEDERAL LAW 1 (1980) (“Virtually

all major programs of federal financial assistance, and most of the significant regulatory statutes,
have in their ancestries a proposal made to Congress by an executive agency, customarily in the form
of a draft bill. Generally speaking, these proposals are developed with greater formality than bills
written within Congress.”).
17 Clinton T. Brass, Working in, and Working with, the Executive Branch, in LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 271, 275 (Tobias A. Dorsey ed., 2006); accord JACK
DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL § 25-3 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that
“[g]overnment agencies bring many bills to every legislature”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146
(2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing] (observing that for most legislation “[t]he
agency may have helped to draft the statutory language, and was likely present and attentive
throughout its legislative consideration”).
18 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 (2014)
[hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II]; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and
the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 998-1010 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I]
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similarly surveyed over one hundred federal agency rule drafters (not agency
legislative drafters), and their responses reinforce that federal agencies play
an important and substantial role in the legislative process.19 According to the
author’s survey, about four in five (78%) agency rule drafters indicated that
their agency always or often participates in a technical drafting role for
statutes their agency administers (and another 15% indicated “sometimes”);
roughly three in five (59%) reported that their agency always or often
participates in a policy or substantive drafting role for the statutes they
administer (and another 27% indicated “sometimes”).20 In other words, recent
empirical work confirms what has long been noted anecdotally in the
literature and what anyone who has participated in the legislative process has
no doubt observed firsthand: federal agencies are involved regularly and
extensively in the legislative process.21
(detailing survey findings of congressional drafters on agency involvement in legislative process);
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) (discussing responses from a case study of legislative drafting in
the Senate Judiciary Committee about the role of agency officials in drafting statutes and conducting
legal research). And Judge Richard Posner has recently joined Professors Bressman and Gluck in
calling for more empirical investigation into the role of federal agencies in the legislative process.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 102 n.33
(2016) (“An interesting subject of further study would be the legislative drafters in federal agencies
and in lobbyist firms.”).
19 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1036-38
(2015) [hereinafter Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation] (detailing findings from a survey of
128 agency rule drafters that found “agencies play a significant role in the technical and substantive
drafting of statutes and even some role in the creation of legislative history”).
20 Id. at 1037 & fig.6. These responses are no doubt conservative estimates of agency involvement
with Congress, as the agency officials surveyed were regulatory personnel, not necessarily agency
officials who are actively involved in the legislative process. See id. (noting lower rates of personal
participation in the legislative process from the agency rule drafters surveyed). Moreover, about one
in four (24%) respondents indicated that their agency participates “in drafting legislative history
(e.g., floor statements, committee reports, conference reports, hearing testimony and questions, etc.)
of statutes the agency administers.” Id. at 1037-38.
21 Moreover, in the 1970s several empirical studies were conducted on the role of federal
agencies in drafting substantive legislative proposals. See DAVIES, supra note 17, § 25-3 (focusing
solely on “[a]gency bill making”); HIRSCH, supra note 16, at vii (explaining its purpose, along with an
accompanying seminar, “to train program lawyers of what used to be the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, so that under the guidance of experienced legislative draftsmen they could
help write the bills, in the areas of their counseling experience, for HEW’s annual legislative
program”); PROFESSIONALIZING LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 5-95
(Reed Dickerson ed., 1973) (exploring further agency-initiated substantive legislation); Brass, supra
note 17, at 271-93 (focusing primarily on agency’s role in substantive legislative activities); Robert S.
Gilmour, Central Legislative Clearance: A Revised Perspective, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150, 150-58 (1971)
(exploring the process within the agency that takes place prior to seeking legislative clearance from
the Executive Office of the President). Perhaps the most ambitious study to date comes from the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legislative Drafting which, under the direction
of Reed Dickerson, commissioned the editors of the Catholic University Law Review to conduct
interviews and develop case studies on how federal agencies draft and advocate for agency-initiated
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Before turning to the role of federal agencies in providing technical drafting
assistance, it is helpful to situate that process within the administrative state’s
larger legislative role.22 Federal agencies engage in two categories of legislative
activities: “substantive” and “technical.”
An executive agency’s “substantive” legislative activities are generally
governed by the OMB coordination and preclearance process under Circular
A-19.23 OMB considers the following to be substantive legislative activity: the
agency’s annual legislative program, any agency “proposed legislation,” and
any agency legislative “report.”24 “Proposed legislation” is defined broadly to
include “[a] draft bill or any supporting document . . . that an agency wishes to
present to Congress for its consideration” as well as “any proposal for or
endorsement of Federal legislation” that the agency desires “to transmit to
Congress, or to any Member or committee, officer or employee of Congress,
or staff of any committee or Member, or to make available to any study group,
commission, or the public.”25 “Report” includes “[a]ny written expression of
official views prepared by an agency on a pending bill for (1) transmittal to any
committee, Member, officer or employee of Congress, or staff of any committee
or Member, or (2) presentation as testimony before a congressional committee.”26
In other words, substantive legislative activity involves the agency expressing
a policy or substantive view on legislation, including the introduction of its own
proposed legislation. These activities—at least for executive agencies—generally
require White House preclearance; it may also require interagency coordination.27
The White House follows a similar process when soliciting agency feedback
to be included in Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) for major bills
pending in Congress.28
substantive legislation. The Catholic University Law Review published its nearly 200-page report in
1972. The Catholic University Study of Federal Legislative Drafting in the Executive Branch, 21 CATH. U.
L. REV. 703 (1972). The report presented findings as to the role of the administrative state in the
legislative process at seven federal agencies. Id. at 709-10. Like nearly all of the scholarship and
empirical work done to date, these rich case studies focused almost exclusively on agency-initiated
substantive legislation. See id. at 705-06 (explaining that the ABA-commissioned study “concentrate[d]
on legislative proposals originating in about a half dozen representative agencies”).
22 For a more comprehensive treatment on which this summary draws, see generally Walker,
Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 5-11.
23 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-19: Legislative Coordination
and Clearance (last revised Sept. 20, 1979), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a019/ [https://
perma.cc/DQ4A-VEHR] [hereinafter OMB Circular A-19].
24 Id. §§ 6-7.
25 Id. § 5(c).
26 Id. § 5(e).
27 See id. § 8 (detailing the OMB clearance process for agency proposed legislation and reports);
see also id. § 9 (detailing the interagency consultation process).
28 See Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget on Legislative Coordination & Clearance
to the Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies 3 (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7RG-HT8G] (“OMB prepares SAPs for major
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Unlike substantive legislative activity, when agencies engage in technical
drafting assistance they provide feedback on congressionally drafted legislation
without taking an official substantive or policy position on the legislation.
OMB contemplates that federal agencies will provide technical drafting
assistance, but it does not require OMB preclearance for such technical
feedback.29 Nor does OMB define technical drafting assistance. Indeed, a
proper definition has been elusive, as underscored during the interviews
conducted for this study. Fortunately, Ganesh Sitaraman has provided a
helpful definition:
Technical assistance refers to help from the executive branch on specific
(hence technical) policy or drafting issues. For example, the head of an office
at the FDA can tell congressional staff how existing provisions are being
interpreted, how a suggested draft would change that interpretation, what the
policy consequences would be, and how resource-intense a new policy would
be for the agency. Technical assistance can also extend to the agency drafting,
editing, or commenting on legislative language.30

As the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has
further explained, “Congress frequently requests technical assistance from
agencies on proposed legislation. Congressional requests for technical
assistance in statutory drafting can range from review of draft legislation to
requests for the agency to draft legislation based on specifications provided
by the Congressional requester.”31 The findings from this study, summarized
in Section I.B, shed unprecedented empirical light on the role of federal
bills scheduled for House or Senate floor action in the coming week, including those to be considered by
the House Rules Committee. In addition, SAPs are sometimes prepared for so-called ‘noncontroversial’
bills considered in the House under suspension of the rules. SAPs are prepared in coordination with
other parts of OMB, the agency or agencies principally concerned, and other EOP units.”).
29 Instead, OMB Circular A-19 merely instructs agencies to keep OMB apprised of such
activities and to make clear to the congressional requester that the agency feedback does not
represent the substantive views of the agency or the Administration. OMB Circular A-19, supra note 23,
§ 7(i). To do that, agencies typically provide a disclaimer along the following lines: “This technical
drafting assistance is provided in response to a congressional request and is not intended to reflect
the viewpoint or policies of any element of the Agency, the Department, or the Administration.”
Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 9. Moreover, the findings from this
study reveal that the Circular A-19 notice requirement for technical drafting assistance is routinely
neither followed by agencies nor enforced by OMB—and that agency technical drafting assistance
is typically done on a confidential basis.
30 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 107; accord Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161,
78,161-62 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Rather than originating with the agency or the Administration, in the
case of technical assistance, Congress originates the draft legislation and asks an agency to review
and provide feedback on the draft. Circular A-19 advises agencies to keep OMB informed of their
activities and to clarify that agency feedback does not reflect the views or policies of the agency or
Administration.”).
31 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).

2017]

Legislating in the Shadows

1387

agencies in the legislative process and suggest a number of implications for
theories of agency statutory interpretation and judicial review thereof, which
are further discussed in Parts II and III.
B. Findings from the Empirical Study
Despite some prior investigation into the role of federal agencies in
proposing substantive legislation for congressional consideration, virtually no
work has been done until now to document the role of the administrative state
in legislating in the shadows via agency technical drafting assistance.32 In
2015, ACUS sought to remedy that deficiency by commissioning a study,
which the author conducted, on agency technical assistance in statutory
drafting. To better understand the process, the author met with agency
officials at some twenty executive departments and independent agencies for
over sixty hours of interviews. Ten of these agencies agreed to participate on
the record: the Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Homeland Security;
Education; Energy; Health and Human Services; Housing and Urban
Development; and Labor, as well as the Federal Reserve and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation.33 The participating agencies then responded
to an anonymous follow-up survey that consisted of forty questions concerning
their technical drafting assistance processes and practices.34
The findings from this study are set forth in the ninety-page final report
that the author submitted to ACUS,35 which also formed the basis for a set of
recommendations ACUS adopted and published in the Federal Register.36 Prior
drafts of the report were discussed at two separate meetings of the ACUS
Rulemaking Committee, circulated to the various agencies participating in the
study and other interested parties for comment and review, and posted on the
ACUS website for public comment.37 Those findings will not be repeated in
full here. Instead, this Part focuses on summarizing the findings most relevant
for the purposes of this Article and depicting how technical assistance is
32 See Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 107, 107-08 n.155 (reviewing literature and concluding that
“[d]espite its importance in the drafting process, technical assistance has hitherto only been
mentioned in passing in legal scholarship—and even then, infrequently”).
33 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 11-12 (detailing study
methodology). Individual overviews of these agencies’ processes for providing technical drafting
assistance are included as Appendices B–K to the ACUS report. Id. at 48-90.
34 The survey and full responses are reproduced as Appendix A to the ACUS report. Id. at 43-47. In
this Article, the questions (and the relevant subquestions) from the survey are cited to with a prefix “Q.”
35 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra 1.
36 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,161-63 (Dec. 16, 2015).
37 For the various public drafts of the report and recommendations, meeting minutes, and other
project documents posted on the ACUS website, see Technical Assistance by Federal Agencies in the
Legislative Process, ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S., https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/technical-assis
tance-federal-agencies-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/47LX-SCMH].
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typically requested, provided, and received—at least from the perspective of
the agency officials interviewed and surveyed.
1. The Congressional Request
How the process begins is quite typical across agencies.38 A staffer for a
congressional committee or for an individual member of Congress—usually
the former—reaches out to the agency and requests technical assistance on
draft legislation. Sometimes, though rarely, the request comes from a member
of Congress directly, but oftentimes the staffer makes the request before the
member has been presented with the draft bill. The congressional staffer
usually has already drafted some proposed bill language and explains what
that language attempts to accomplish. The staffer expects the agency to
provide general feedback—often with suggested edits and redlines to the
draft language. On rare occasions, the congressional staffer has not yet drafted
the bill and instead provides a set of specifications for the legislation, with
the request that the agency develop the first draft.
Most of these requests for technical drafting assistance occur before the
proposed legislation has been introduced in Congress, though sometimes the
initial request arrives after the legislation has been introduced during, for
instance, the committee markup stage. (Sometimes the agency offers technical
assistance on proposed legislation without an express congressional request.)
In all of these instances, the congressional requester generally expects the request
and response to remain confidential. That expectation of confidentiality was
repeatedly emphasized in the interviews with agency officials. Seldom does
the technical drafting assistance process end with the initial response. The agency
routinely remains involved in providing technical drafting assistance—often
coupled with substantive legislative assistance via the OMB process—as the
proposed legislation works its way through the legislative process.
The agency officials interviewed underscored that the technical drafting
assistance process is quite informal and often driven by existing relationships
between congressional staffers and various agency officials. One agency
official, for instance, remarked, “When the real work gets done, it’s the subject
matter experts at the agency and at the congressional committee that interact.
I can guarantee you that they have their direct lines.”39 These informal
communications notwithstanding, the congressional requester’s initial formal
agency contact is typically the agency’s legislative affairs office; this is the
agency’s official liaison with Congress and manages all agency communications
38 The findings with respect to the congressional request process summarized here are set forth
in greater detail in Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 12-16, 33-35.
39 Id. at 13.
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and interactions with the Hill.40 For executive branch agencies, this office
consists mainly of, or at least is directed by, political appointees.
It is important to note that although these requests are officially for “technical”
drafting assistance, the agency officials interviewed repeatedly emphasized
that the congressional staffer often really also wants to receive the agency’s
substantive feedback on the proposed legislation. Sometimes, the agency
officials explained, the congressional staffer just wants to know if the
proposed legislation would make good policy. Other times, as one official
explained, “the [congressional] staffer wants to sell it to the Member and
being able to say that the agency says it’s okay or has worked on it” helps
make that sale to the staffer’s boss.41
In sum, this technical drafting assistance process takes place confidentially,
often before legislation has even been introduced in Congress, in an informal
process between agency and congressional personnel with a preexisting
working relationship. During this process, moreover, the congressional staffer
does not want just “technical” assistance, but also “substantive” feedback—at
least informally and off the record—that OMB Circular A-19 arguably
contemplates should go through White House preclearance.
Indeed, even the agency officials interviewed expressed confusion about
the difference between technical and substantive feedback. As one agency
official put it, “The technical–substantive distinction involves a lot of
judgment; it’s a smell test.”42 Moreover, a comment by one agency official
interviewed for the Shobe study echoes a number of comments made by
agency officials interviewed for this study: “The more policy oriented it gets
the more levels of bureaucracy it has to be cleared through . . . . If I want to
provide policy input but don’t want to go through a bunch of layers of
bureaucracy then I pick up the phone.”43 These findings illustrate some of the
important aspects of how legislating in the shadows takes place.
The agencies also reported that the amount of technical drafting assistance
on proposed legislation is substantial. Agency officials interviewed uniformly
indicated that the number of congressionally drafted bills for which they provide
technical assistance is much greater than the number of agency-initiated
substantive bills (those that would go through the OMB Circular A-19

40 In the anonymous follow-up survey, the agency respondents indicated that the agency’s
legislative affairs staff is either always (40%), usually (50%), or often (10%) involved in the agency’s
response. Id. at app. A (Q3(a)).
41 Id. at 34. In the anonymous follow-up survey, respondents either agreed (40%) or somewhat
agreed (60%) that “what congressional staffers often really want is to know the agency’s substantive
position on the proposed legislation.” Id. at app. A (Q6(d)).
42 Id. at 34.
43 Shobe, supra note 13, at 490.
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preclearance process).44 There also seemed to be a general consensus among
agency officials interviewed that their agency provides technical assistance
during the drafting phase on nearly all of the bills that ultimately get enacted
that directly affect their agency. They seemed less confident about bills that
only indirectly affect their agency, and feedback was mixed among agencies
about appropriations legislation.45
These findings are consistent with prior empirical work. In particular, of
the fifty-four agency staffers involved in legislative matters who were
surveyed in 2014 as part of the Shobe study, almost two in three indicated
that their agency plays “at least some role” in 100% of the legislation that is
enacted in the areas covered by the agency; and nearly all of the remaining
staffers indicated that their agency plays at least some role in 75% to 99% of
such enacted legislation.46
2. The Agency Response
How agencies respond is also quite typical across agencies.47 The agency
officials interviewed uniformly indicated that their agency responds to just
about every congressional request for technical drafting assistance that the
agency receives—regardless of the political party affiliation of the requesting
member (whether a part of the minority or majority party in Congress, or
whether a member of the President’s party), the effect the legislation would
have on the agency’s policy objectives, the deadline the congressional requester
has set for response, the resources available to the agency to respond, the
likelihood of such legislation actually being enacted, or any other factor. The
agency respondents’ anonymous responses in the follow-up survey generally
support these interview responses.48
At first blush, this finding may be surprising. After all, one may assume
that politics—or at least policy preferences—would influence whether an
agency decides to help a congressional requester on proposed legislation. But
the agency officials underscored a number of reasons why the settled norm is
to respond to virtually every request.49 First and foremost, it is critical that
44
45
46

Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 13-14.
The anonymous follow-up survey generally confirmed these impressions. See id. at 13-16 & fig.1.
Shobe, supra note 13, at 482-83 & fig.8; see also id. at 476 & fig.5 (“Forty-eight respondents
(89%) said that Congress often or always requests agency review, only one respondent said rarely
(2%), and no respondents said never.”).
47 The findings with respect to the agency response are set forth in greater detail in Walker,
Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 16-26, 30-32.
48 See id. at 16-20 & fig.2.
49 See also Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (stating
that providing Congress with technical drafting assistance is worthwhile because it “assists the agency
in maintaining a healthy and productive relationship with Congress, ensures the proposed legislation
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federal agencies maintain a healthy and productive working relationship with
Congress. Indiscriminately providing technical drafting assistance helps on
that front. Moreover, providing technical drafting assistance helps ensure that
the proposed legislation does not unnecessarily disrupt the existing statutory
(and regulatory) scheme. In other words, agencies provide technical drafting
assistance on proposed legislation that will affect them to ensure that the
legislation is technically correct—even if they do not necessarily agree with
all, or even much, of the proposed legislation’s substance. As one of the agency
respondents in the Shobe study observed,
Sometimes there are bills we don’t like, but we still try to make it the best we
can. When we give technical assistance we are trying to help the drafter make
the bill the best we can even if we don’t like it. If it ultimately passes it is
better that we have input than not.50

Similarly, even if the proposed legislation is unlikely to be enacted,
providing technical drafting assistance helps educate the congressional
staffers about the agency’s existing statutory and regulatory framework. The
importance of congressional educational efforts was a recurring theme during
the agency interviews and in responses to the follow-up survey. And it became
one of the main recommendations that ACUS ultimately adopted: encouraging
agencies to be “actively engaged in educational efforts, including in-person
briefings and interactions, to educate Congressional staff about the agencies’
respective statutory and regulatory frameworks and agency technical drafting
expertise.”51 Finally, one agency official noted that the agency provides technical
drafting assistance because it serves as “a very good source of intelligence.”52
By responding to nearly all technical drafting assistance requests from members
of Congress and thus encouraging congressional staffers to submit such requests
on any legislation they are contemplating, the agency is better able to
anticipate, monitor, and respond to potential legislative proposals that could
affect the agency and its regulatory activities.
Even though federal agencies respond to nearly every congressional
technical drafting assistance request,53 this does not mean that the agencies
is consonant with the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, helps educate Congressional staff
about the agency’s statutory and regulatory framework, and keeps the agency informed of potential
legislative action that could affect the agency”).
50 Shobe, supra note 13, at 477.
51 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).
52 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 18.
53 In the Shobe study, however, at least one agency official stated that the agency was less likely
to provide assistance on a bill to which the agency was opposed or which had little chance of passage.
See Shobe, supra note 13, at 478 (“[I]f our department hates a bill, we don’t want to fix it for them
because from our perspective it can’t be fixed. If we strongly oppose the bill we are not going to help
them make technical changes to make it better.”); id. at 479 (“There are lots of bills drafted in Congress
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respond the same way to each request. The various factors listed above could
still affect how much time, energy, and detail are provided for a particular
request. For instance, as one agency official remarked, “The agency always
responds to technical comments requests; we may put more or less time or
resources into requests that come from, for example, our authorizing committees
versus another, more tangentially-related committee.”54 Another respondent
nicely summarized the majority view shared during the interviews:
We strive to accommodate all requests and do so “blind” to the chamber, to
the majority or minority status of the requesting party, to the nature of the
request (i.e., from committee staff or Member staff), or [to] the likelihood of
action. Those elements, however, may affect the priority placed on the
assistance provided. If anything, scope and timing dictate the amount of
assistance provided. Rarely, do we refuse to provide assistance, and only if
there is good cause to do so (e.g., the request goes to legislation that is
repugnant to public policy or the interests of the United States).55

Not surprisingly, ACUS formally endorsed the distinction between whether
and how to respond to congressional requests, recommending that “[f]ederal
agencies should endeavor to provide Congress with technical drafting
assistance when asked,” but that “[a]gencies should recognize that they need
not expend the same amount of time and resources on each request.”56
The agency officials expressed less consensus with respect to the format of an
agency’s response to a technical drafting assistance request.57 In the interviews,
many agency officials explained that the process of providing technical
assistance is highly informal and that much of it takes place orally instead of
in writing. One agency official’s comment during an interview is reflective of
at least a half dozen other agency officials who remarked on the form of the
technical assistance: “Try to avoid redlining and avoid email. . . . Sometimes
we draft up talking points or comments, but almost always try to find a way
to just pick up the phone.”58
The anonymous follow-up survey, however, provided conflicting responses.
The agency respondents indicated that the predominant form of feedback
that are never going to see the light of day. Those are usually in response to a specific constituent’s
request and we don’t really bother looking at those.”).
54 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 19.
55 Id.; see also Shobe, supra note 13, at 506 (“[M]any respondents reported different interactions
with congressional staff that are not from the same party as the President. Twenty-eight respondents
(52%) said their interactions are often or always different, and another fourteen respondents (26%)
said their interactions are sometimes different. This is despite the fact that many respondents said
that they try to offer assistance to both parties.”); id. at 490 & fig.11.
56 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).
57 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 24.
58 Id.
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takes place in writing.59 For instance, all respondents indicated that their
agency usually (30%) or often (70%) provides “[w]ritten feedback in a form
other than a redline or actual draft legislation (for example, email or memo
summarizing technical feedback).”60 Similarly, four in five respondents indicated
that their agency usually (40%) or often (40%) transmits an “[a]gency redline
of draft legislation provided by congressional staffer,” with the remainder
indicating sometimes.61 By contrast, only three in five respondents indicated
that their agency usually (20%) or often (40%) uses “[o]ral communication of
comments and suggestions” to provide technical drafting assistance, with the
remainder indicating that oral communication is sometimes (30%) or rarely
(10%) used.62 To be sure, these options are not mutually exclusive; the agency
officials indicated during interviews and in their survey responses that there
is often overlap between oral and written feedback. But even so, these survey
responses indicate that the idea that agencies try to avoid providing written
technical feedback seems misplaced, or at least overstated.
In light of the general congressional expectation that the technical
drafting assistance process remain confidential, a review of the substance of
agency responses to technical assistance exceeded the scope of this study.
During the interviews and follow-up surveys, however, some general themes
emerged. First, as detailed in subsection II.B.2, agency officials consistently
expressed concern and frustration with the lack of congressional awareness of
the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, the poor quality of legislative
drafting by congressional staffers, and the rapid turnover among congressional
staffers.63 Because congressional staffers often propose legislation that would
duplicate existing law or unintentionally conflict with existing statutory (and
regulatory) schemes, the agency officials explained that their agency responses
are often quite extensive and detailed. However, as discussed above, the length
and depth of agency responses vary based on a number of factors, including
the reasonableness of the deadline to provide technical drafting assistance and
the likelihood of enactment.
A number of agency officials indicated that they provide detailed technical
drafting assistance—even when there is little likelihood of the legislation
being enacted—as a means of educating congressional staffers on the current
statutory and regulatory framework and on what the agency is presently
doing to address the problem.64 To further educate congressional staffers on
how the proposed legislation would affect existing law, for instance, a few
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 17.
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agencies provide not just a redlined version of the proposed legislation, but
also a redlined version of the existing law that shows what the proposed
legislation would change.65 Indeed, based on this study’s findings, ACUS
adopted the recommendation that, “[w]hen feasible and appropriate, agencies
should provide the Congressional requester a redline draft showing how the
bill would modify existing law (known as a Ramseyer/Cordon draft) as part
of the technical assistance response.”66
Perhaps due in part to these agency perceptions of congressional drafter
ignorance or inexperience, many of the agency officials interviewed noted
that a primary objective in providing technical drafting assistance is to preserve
the current statutory scheme and the agency’s accompanying regulatory
authority.67 When asked to expand on what this means, one agency official
invoked the medical analogy of “first, do no harm.” Indeed, a general theme
emerged during the interviews that most legislative activity initiated in
Congress has the potential to harm the agency’s current authority, so in many
circumstances the agency’s primary objective is to minimize the harm and
preserve the agency’s existing regulatory authority.
Others noted that their goal is to preserve “flexibility” in the current
statutory framework. A few mentioned that one way to do that is to ensure
that proposed legislation is drafted “broadly” to maintain agency flexibility
in implementing the statutory mandate. Although no agency official expressly
stated that the agency’s goal is to draft the statute as ambiguously as possible
so that interpretive authority is delegated to the agency itself, the overall
themes of “flexibility,” “drafting broadly,” and “preserving regulatory authority”
were quite common in the agency interviews conducted for this study.
Finally, with respect to who at the agency is involved in providing
technical drafting assistance, the agency officials reported that the main actors
are typically those within the agency with expertise in the substantive subject
matter in addition to those with expertise in legislative drafting.68 In other
words, although the legislative affairs staff may be the congressional liaison
and gatekeeper, the program and policy experts and the agency’s legislative
counsel quickly become involved in providing comments and reviewing the
proposed legislation.69 For some agencies, the regulatory counsel are also
involved, but that is not the case at most agencies.70 That finding is discussed
further in Section II.A.

65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 37.
Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015).
Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 21. For a more detailed breakdown, see id. at 21-23 & fig.3.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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The agency officials also indicated that the White House is generally not
involved in technical drafting assistance and that private parties, including
regulated entities or other outside organizations, are rarely involved in
developing the agency’s response. Similarly, despite the requirement in OMB
Circular A-19 that agencies provide notice to OMB of any technical drafting
assistance requested or provided, the agency officials indicated that their
agency generally does not provide such notice, nor does OMB request it.71
3. The Congressional Reply
Although the study did not endeavor to interview or survey congressional
staffers on how they reply to agency technical drafting assistance, the follow-up
survey of the agency officials explored which factors the agencies perceived
as affecting whether the congressional requester accepted the agency’s technical
feedback on proposed legislation.72
Before proceeding to the findings from these follow-up survey questions,
it is appropriate to note the methodological limitations of this ACUS study,
which focused on presenting the perspectives of federal agencies—not
congressional staffers—in the legislative process. Although the ACUS study
provides a critical empirical window into technical drafting assistance, it is
obviously an incomplete one. Congressional staffers may well disagree about
the rate at which they request technical drafting assistance and the factors
that affect whether they seek such assistance (such as whether there is divided
government or whether the member of Congress is of the President’s party).
They may also disagree about the rate at which they accept agency technical
drafting assistance. Much more empirical work needs to be done to fully
understand the process.
Turning to the congressional reply, the questions in the follow-up survey
build on findings from the Shobe study, where the agency officials surveyed
“overwhelmingly reported that Congress accepts technical comments,” with
nearly all (96%) respondents reporting that Congress does so always or often.73
Similar to the responses concerning the factors affecting whether the agency
decides to provide the requested technical assistance, the identity and politics
of the congressional requester do not seem to matter too much.74 But other
factors do seem to be important.
71 The ACUS study expressly did not explore the role of OMB in the legislative process. See
id. at 33. As noted in the report and this Article, however, agency officials volunteered many observations
about how their agency interacted with OMB in providing substantive and technical drafting
assistance in the legislative process. Id. at 33-35.
72 For greater detail with respect to findings regarding the congressional reply, see id. at 26-28.
73 Shobe, supra note 13, at 481 & fig.7.
74 Id.
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For instance, the stage of the legislative process at which the technical
assistance is provided seems to matter. Three in five (60%) agency respondents
indicated that it often appears to matter whether technical assistance was
offered “prior to the legislation being introduced (as opposed to, for instance,
at the committee markup stage or later).”75 Another three in ten (30%)
indicated this timing sometimes matters, while the remainder (10%) indicated
it only rarely matters.76 This is consistent with the Shobe study, where a few
respondents reported that the timing of the agency’s comments mattered,
with one respondent stating: “After the markup . . . if we want to raise an issue
we really have to push hard because no one wants us to be bringing up issues.
You have to convince them to make changes at that point.”77 It similarly seems
to matter whether the proposed legislation is likely to be enacted. Three in
five agency respondents reported that the likelihood of enactment seems to
always (10%) or often (50%) matter, while another three in ten (30%) indicated
it sometimes matters and the remainder (10%) indicated it only rarely matters.78
Another theme that emerged during the agency interviews was that
relationships matter. Indeed, of the eight factors included in the survey, the
agency–congressional relationship received the highest composite score of 3.9
(where a score of 4.0 equals often).79 Three in five respondents indicated that
it usually (30%) or often (30%) seems to matter “[w]hether there is a strong
working relationship between the agency officials involved and the congressional
staffers requesting assistance,” while the remainder of respondents indicated
that working relationships “sometimes” matter.80 Agency officials indicated
that another factor that matters to Congress is, somewhat surprisingly, the
format of the technical assistance. Seven in ten respondents indicated that
“[w]hether the technical assistance consists of suggested redlined changes to
draft legislation (as opposed to more generalized feedback)” usually (10%) or
often (60%) matters, with the remainder indicating it sometimes (20%) or
rarely (10%) matters.81 Perhaps agency perceptions that Congress is more
likely to incorporate feedback delivered in writing explain why agencies
provide feedback in writing, rather than just doing so orally.

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 27.
Id.
Shobe, supra note 13, at 480 n.106.
Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATING IN THE SHADOWS
As the findings outlined in Part I suggest, this previously underexplored
yet widespread practice of legislating in the shadows has important doctrinal,
theoretical, and normative implications for administrative law.
Many of these implications involve a more nuanced understanding of the
principal–agent relationship between Congress and the regulatory state.82
The potentially terrific news is that there is a strong, ongoing relationship
between members of Congress and federal agencies. The congressional
principal and its bureaucratic agents communicate regularly to improve the
instructions that the principal provides to its agents to implement policy,
while also leveraging agency expertise in amending the law via the legislative
process. Such a working relationship, especially the practice of agencies
providing technical drafting assistance on proposed legislation, should be
encouraged and strengthened. The less ideal news may be that the bureaucratic
agents appear to have more influence over shaping the authority delegated to
them by their congressional principal than previously appreciated—precisely
because they can heavily influence the scope and character of their legislative
mandates.83 These permutations of the bureaucratic principal–agent model
will be further explored in this Part.
This Article focuses on two implications of legislating in the shadows that
emerge from this more nuanced understanding of the bureaucratic principal–agent
model. First, this phenomenon could support the growing scholarly call that
agencies should be allowed to engage in more purposivist interpretation than
their judicial counterparts. Second, it may cast some doubt on the foundations
for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, in light of federal
82
83

See supra notes 3–4 (reviewing literature on principal–agency theory in administrative law).
Indeed, this relationship may be further complicated by the fact that numerous agency
officials are detailed to Congress each year—with their agency covering the cost of such details. For
instance, over 200 agency officials detailed in Congress during the 113th Congress. See S. REP. NO.
114-112, at 11-18 (2015) (listing all of the approved details by agency and congressional committee).
See generally Memorandum on Detail of Law Enforcement Agents to Congressional Committees
from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Acting Deputy
Att’y Gen. (Sept. 13, 1988), https://www.justice.gov/file/24116/download [https://perma.cc/ZCQ6TSFW] (concluding that such details are statutorily authorized, that they “do not violate the
principle of separation of powers as long as the details are advisory in nature and involve functions
not required by the Constitution to be performed by an ‘officer’ of the United States,” but that the
agency should carefully consider conflicts that could arise); Memorandum of Department of Justice
Attorneys to Congressional Committees from John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to the Dir. of the Dep’t of Justice Task Force on Criminal Code Revision (May
16, 1977), https://www.justice.gov/file/21051/download [https://perma.cc/A3Z3-XXTH] (concluding
that there would be no ethical problems in a Justice Department attorney being detailed to Congress
“[i]f the attorney were instead to be viewed as counsel for the Department detailed by the Attorney
General to work with, rather than for, the [congressional] subcommittee”). Many thanks to Will
Levy for this point on congressional details.
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agencies’ involvement in drafting the legislation that ultimately delegates to
the same agencies the authority to interpret that legislation. Each will be
addressed in turn.
A. Implications for Agency Statutory Interpretation
As Jerry Mashaw observed nearly a decade ago, “virtually no one has even
asked, much less answered, some simple questions about agency statutory
interpretation.”84 For example, many assert that the role of legislative history
should be the same regardless of whether an agency or judge is the interpreter
or whether legislative history is deemed to reveal congressional intent or
statutory meaning. Yet in his preliminary inquiry into the matter, Mashaw
found “persuasive grounds for believing that legitimate techniques and
standards for agency statutory interpretation diverge sharply from the
legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory interpretation.”85
Indeed, nearly a quarter century ago Peter Strauss argued that “[l]egislative
history has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not
readily be conceived by persons who are outside government and are accustomed
to considering its relevance only to actual or prospective judicial resolution
of discrete disputes.”86 He went on to explain the role of legislative history in
agency statutory interpretation by describing the law library of a federal agency:
Alongside the statutes for which the agency is responsible, you will find shelf
after shelf of their legislative history—collections that embrace not only
printed materials such as might make their way to a depositary library, but
also transcripts of relevant hearings, correspondence, and other informal
traces of the continuing interactions that go on between an agency and
Capitol Hill as a statute is being shaped in the legislative process, and perhaps
afterwards in [the] course of implementation.87

One of the important benefits of “[t]he enduring and multifaceted character
of the agency’s relationship with Congress,” Strauss explained, is that the
agency has comparative expertise “to distinguish reliably those considerations
that served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat, from the
more manipulative chaff.”88 As Mashaw has noted, although not speaking in
principal–agent terms, Strauss underscores that “agencies have a direct
relationship with Congress that gives them insights into legislative purposes
84 Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (2005); see also id. at 502 n.2 (reviewing literature).
85 Id. at 504.
86 Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 14, at 329.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 347.
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and meaning . . . . For a faithful agent to forget this content, to in some sense
ignore its institutional memory, would be to divest itself of critical resources
in carrying out congressional designs.”89
It is perhaps for this reason that a number of administrative law scholars—in
addition to Mashaw and Strauss—have called for a more purposivist approach
to agency statutory interpretation (than to judicial interpretation) based on the
comparative institutional expertise—or the unique “interpretive voice”90—of
federal agencies. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, have argued
that “attention to institutional considerations can show why agencies might
be given the authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be denied
that authority.”91 Indeed, Sunstein strengthened his call for comparative expertise
in a recent article aptly entitled The Most Knowledgeable Branch.92 William
Eskridge has advanced a somewhat analogous position: agencies should “read
statutes broadly, in light of their purposes, and follow a quasi-legislative
political process for interpretations addressing big policy questions or arenas
not resolved by the statute.”93 Kevin Stack and others have reached conclusions
along similar comparative expertise lines.94
Sitaraman, moreover, has reached a similar conclusion that “[t]he executive’s
role in legislative drafting provides additional support to the Strauss-Mashaw
89
90

See Mashaw, supra note 84, at 511 (discussing Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 14).
See Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005) (asserting
that theories of interpretation should “consider[] not only the abilities and limitations of courts and
administrative agencies, but also how both of these institutions express their conclusions; that is, the
relationship between what they do and what they say they do”).
91 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885,
928 (2003); accord ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205-08 (2006) (emphasizing the strictly institutional
justifications for agency deference). See generally Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension
of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003) (agreeing that there is an
institutional dimension of legal interpretation but disagreeing that this is a novel insight, as scholars
and judges have long considered this institutional dimension).
92 Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2016).
93 William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 427.
94 See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 887-900 (2015) (taking the public choice argument further by asserting that
Congress directs agencies to engage in purposivist statutory interpretation); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81,
91-99 (1985) (arguing that delegation of policy decisions to agencies is better than delegation to
courts based on comparative accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy); David B. Spence &
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 134-41 (2000) (arguing
on public choice grounds that lawmaking delegation to agencies is comparatively better than such
delegation to courts); Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 159-61
(2012) [hereinafter Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons] (arguing that agencies’ comparative
expertise is a reason to “discontinu[e] the use of modern constitutional avoidance in the review of
administrative interpretations of law”).
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thesis that agency interpretive practice can and should diverge from judicial
interpretive process.”95
Empirical studies provide further support for this more purposivist approach
to agency statutory interpretation. In particular, over nine in ten (94%)
congressional drafters in the Bressman and Gluck study indicated that a purpose
of legislative history is to shape the way agencies interpret statutory ambiguities;
one in five (21%) respondents volunteered that legislative history also provides
an oversight role for agency implementation of a statute it administers.96
One congressional drafter explained, “We use everything from floor statements
to letters to the agency—members know how to communicate with agencies
and make their policy preferences known . . . .”97 Moreover, over half (53%) of the
congressional respondents emphasized the importance of legislative history
in the appropriations context, as such legislative history specifies where the
funds appropriated go within the administrative state.98
The author’s prior study of agency rule drafters provides similar support.99
For instance, three in four (76%) rule drafters considered legislative history
useful in interpreting statutes, and at least four in five agreed that legislative
history serves to explain the purposes of a statute (93%) and the meaning of
particular terms in a statute (80%).100 Of over twenty interpretive principles
covered in the survey, legislative history had the sixth-highest response for
use in interpretation: only Chevron deference, the whole act rule, the ordinary
meaning canon, the Mead doctrine, and noscitur a sociis were reported by more
rule drafters as being used in their interpretation and rule-drafting efforts.101
Likewise, the rule drafters surveyed demonstrated, on balance, a sound
understanding of how to assess the reliability of legislative history, including
that committee and conference reports are usually the most reliable and that
floor statements by nonsponsors are the least reliable.102 Many rule drafters
indicated that the timing of the legislative history matters, whereas whether
a member of Congress drafted or even read or heard the legislative history
does not.103 These findings are consistent with those of the congressional
respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study.104 Moreover, the findings on
agency expertise in legislative history and process seem to support the

95 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 128.
96 Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 18, at 768.
97 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 18, at 972 (internal quotation
98 Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 18, at 768.
99 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19.
100 Id. at 1020 fig.2, 1041 fig.7.
101 Id. at 1020 fig.2, 1038-39.
102 Id. at 1043-44 & fig.8.
103 Id. at 1043-47 & figs.8-9.
104 See id. at 1046.

marks omitted).
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scholarly call for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation
(as compared to a more textualist approach to judicial statutory interpretation).
One set of findings from the author’s prior study, however, raises some
questions. Nearly four in five (78%) rule drafters reported that their agencies
always or often participate in a technical drafting role of statutes they administer,
and three in five (59%) indicated that their agencies similarly participate in a
policy or substantive drafting role.105 But the rule drafters reported that their
personal participation in the legislative process was less involved: 29% always
or often participate in technical drafting (and 29% sometimes participate);
18% always or often participate in substantive drafting (and 29% sometimes
participate).106 In other words, the agency lawyers involved in drafting the rules
are not necessarily involved in the agency’s efforts to assist Congress in drafting
the legislation, and thus do not have firsthand expertise in that legislative history.
The lower personal participation may be explained in part by the
organizational division in many agency general counsel offices between the
legislation and regulation staffs. The separation between legislative and
regulatory functions within an agency’s general counsel office raises a number
of questions about agency statutory interpretation: Under an agency’s typical
structure, does the agency’s legislative experience get incorporated into its
rulemaking activities, such that the Congress–agency relationship Strauss
detailed actually extends to agency statutory interpretation? Or do the
legislative experts at the agency only get involved once there is a threat of
judicial challenge? In light of the theoretical arguments that have been
advanced about the distinct role legislative history—and purposivism more
generally—should play in agency statutory interpretation, it is critical to
better ask and answer these questions.
The findings from this study on the role federal agencies play in the
legislative process shed some important light on these questions. As discussed
above, federal agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast
majority of the proposed legislation that directly affects them and most
legislation that is actually enacted. The relationship that emerges from the
study is perhaps not of the principal–agent variety where Congress dictates
its wishes to its bureaucratic agents, but a partnership where Congress and
federal agencies work together to draft legislation that affects the agencies’
statutory and regulatory schemes.107 Federal agencies are at the legislative
table and are deeply involved in the legislative process—at the outset and then

105
106
107

Id. at 1037 & fig.6.
Id.
This partnership model, of course, can still be framed in principal–agent terms, just with a
regulatory agent who is more involved in the congressional principal’s delegation of authority to the
agent than the traditional principal–agent bureaucratic model may envision.
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throughout the legislative process—that results in statutes that the agencies
administer. In that sense, Strauss’s anecdotal depiction of agency expertise in
legislative history and process is quite accurate. And thus the scholarly call
for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation seems
empirically grounded.
There may be one significant wrinkle, however. Seven in ten agencies
indicated that the agency’s rulemakers/regulatory counsel are rarely (60%) or
never (10%) involved; few (10%) indicate that they are sometimes involved;
and still few (20%) indicate that they are usually involved.108 This generates a
composite score of 2.6 (where a score of 2.0 indicates rarely and a score of 3.0
means sometimes).109 This is somewhat surprising. At both the Department
of Energy and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, for
instance, the legislative and regulatory counsel are housed in the same
division within the agency general counsel’s office and cross-train in both
legislative and regulatory drafting.110 One agency respondent commented
along these lines: “Legislation/regulatory attorneys are in the same office at
our agency, so regulatory staff have the same input as the agency’s legislative
counsel, as appropriate for a given request.”111
But at most other agencies, these lawyers are not housed in the same
division and interact far less frequently, at least with respect to legislative
drafting.112 One respondent noted in the comments that “[o]ur answer (never)
pertains to staff who are dedicated regulation writers. Other program staff are
often involved in developing regulations and in the regulatory process; they
participate more frequent[ly] in developing technical assistance than [d]o
dedicated regulation writers.”113
In other words, at most agencies the lawyers who draft the regulations and
the lawyers who help draft the legislation do not interact in a way that would
suggest that the agency’s expertise in the legislative history and process that
108
109
110
111
112

Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3(d)).
Id.
See id. at 22.
Id. at app. A (Q3 cmt.3).
This disconnect may also cast some doubt on one of the rationales for judicial deference to
agency statutory interpretations, namely “that agency officials are more knowledgeable of the
legislative intent since they were direct or indirect participants in the legislative process.”
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 145 (1990); see also id. (further noting that this argument “can be met by exploiting
empirical insufficiencies” about actual agency involvement in the legislative process). This argument
is further explored in Section II.B.
113 Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3 cmt.2). This
comment may explain the apparent discrepancy between the agency officials surveyed here and those
surveyed in the Shobe study. Nearly 90% of those surveyed by Shobe indicated that “people within
agencies who are tasked with day-to-day implementation and administration of agency statutes are
also involved in the [drafting assistance] review process.” Shobe, supra note 13, at 483.
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resulted in the legislation is transmitted to the lawyers who actually interpret
that statute. This concern, however, is likely overstated. After all, seven in ten
agency respondents indicated that agency program/policy experts either
always (20%) or usually (50%) participate in providing legislative drafting
assistance, with the remainder reporting that such participation only sometimes
(20%) or rarely (10%) occurs.114 This generates a composite score of 4.5 (where
a score of 4.0 represents often, and 5.0 means usually).115 This is consistent
with the Shobe study, in which nearly nine in ten (89%) agency officials
surveyed indicated that they “always notify affected parties within their
agency of potential legislation.”116 As one agency respondent in the Shobe
study observed, “We are the technical drafters, but the program clients drive
the policy. They are the ones carrying out the policy so they know it much
better than we do.”117 Accordingly, there may not be a direct link between the
legislative and regulatory lawyers, but the program/policy experts likely
bridge that gap by consulting with both sets of lawyers during their drafting
processes. Indeed, one of the eight ACUS recommendations based on this
study focuses on better leveraging agency expertise along these lines.118
In sum, these findings on the role of federal agencies in the legislative
process provide additional empirical support for a more purposivist approach
to agency statutory interpretation. Federal agencies are deeply involved in
the legislative process from a technical assistance perspective for statutes that
directly affect them and thus have a comparative expertise over courts in
understanding what Congress intended when it enacted the statutes that
agencies administer. The agency lawyers involved in legislative and regulatory
drafting may not share that information directly at every agency, but the
agency policy experts are involved in both processes and likely ensure that
the rule drafters are familiar with what happened in the legislative process.
Before turning to the implications of legislating in the shadows for judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations, it is worth considering one important
counterargument. Because agencies are at the table and substantially involved
in the drafting of legislation they ultimately interpret, one could argue for a
more restrained, textualist approach to agency statutory interpretation. After

114
115
116
117
118

Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at app. A (Q3(c)).
Id.
Shobe, supra note 13, at 483.
Id. at 484.
See Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Similarly,
agencies should consider ways to better identify and involve the appropriate agency experts—in
particular, the relevant agency policy and program personnel in addition to the legislative drafting
experts—in the technical drafting assistance process. These efforts may involve, for example,
establishing an internal agency distribution list for technical drafting assistance requests and
maintaining an internal list of appropriate agency policy and program contacts.”).

1404

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 1377

all, the agencies already had their opportunity to attempt to clean up the
statutory text and, the argument would go, should not get another, more
purposivist bite at the apple. Indeed, in presenting these findings at various
conferences and workshops, a recurring suggestion has been to consider
incorporating contract law’s contra proferentem doctrine to construe the
ambiguous statutory language against the agency drafter.119
This appears to be a novel suggestion for administrative law, although it
has been applied in the somewhat related context of government contracting.
For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that “[t]his principle is appropriately
accorded considerable emphasis in [the context of a government contract]
because of the Government’s vast economic resources and stronger bargaining
position in contract negotiations.”120 As one commentator has noted in that
context, this principle “is not a method by which the true intent of the parties
is determined”; instead, contra proferentem “is simply an allocation of the
burden of ambiguity in contract language on the basis of responsibility for its
draftsmanship.”121 Indeed, as Michelle Boardman has explained, “Contra
proferentem is meant to give drafters an incentive to draft cleanly, by construing
ambiguous language against the drafter.”122
Although this analogy may have some intuitive appeal (at least for those
who bemoan the sprawl of the modern administrative state),123 it seems to fail
for both practical and doctrinal reasons. Practically, because technical drafting
assistance occurs in the shadows, it is difficult if not impossible for a court to
ascertain which parts of the statute the agency agreed with, much less actually
119 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (reiterating
“the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or
a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies
the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”).
120 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970).
121 John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra Proferentem in the Government Contract Interpretation
Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 380 (1980); accord 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2016 ed.) (“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its
application does not assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or
even the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the language used. It is chiefly a
rule of policy, generally favoring the underdog.”).
122 Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2006). For more on the normative basis for the rule, see Kenneth S. Abraham, A
Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 533-44 (1996).
123 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“The administrative state wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life. The
Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s vast and varied federal bureaucracy and the authority
administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political activities. [T]he
administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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helped draft. Doctrinally, the analogy seems too tenuous in light of the fact
that federal agencies merely assist in drafting statutes; Congress is the party
that ultimately enacts the legislation.
Perhaps another way to think about the doctrinal (and practical) flaws is to
consider whether a court should similarly apply contra proferentem against a
regulated entity if the statutory language at issue was drafted by industry
lobbyists. In practice, neither the congressional nor the lobbyist drafter is likely
to make public which parts of the legislation were drafted or otherwise influenced
by the lobbyist. Incorporating contra proferentem into statutory interpretation
would likely only encourage more secrecy. As for the doctrinal concerns,
bicameralism and presentment make clear that the enacted text is that of
Congress, not that of the many hands that may have held the pen at various
times during the legislative process. It is difficult to see how punishing the agency
(or the lobbyist) for the final legislative product would provide an incentive for
the agency (or the lobbyist) to draft more clearly when Congress ultimately
holds the pen at the end of the process. Analogizing the contract-drafting
process to the legislative process, at least with respect to the policy rationales
for contra proferentem, is thus ill advised. Moreover, as discussed in Section
II.B, these concerns are better addressed by adjusting the level of deference
courts owe to certain agency statutory interpretations.
B. Implications for Judicial Review
Whereas the findings of this study regarding the role of federal agencies
in the legislative process provide strong support for a more purposivist
approach to agency statutory interpretation, the same findings are more
mixed with respect to their implications for Chevron deference—the doctrine
that a reviewing court must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute that the agency administers.124
On the one hand, judicial deference due to agency expertise—a common
justification for Chevron deference—may be bolstered by the fact that
agencies often play a critical role in legislative drafting. On the other,
specifically because agencies help draft statutes, often in the shadows, courts
should not defer to every reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguities that
the agency itself may have helped create; instead, perhaps they should apply
the less-deferential Skidmore standard based on the agency’s power to persuade.125
Or, at the very least, the Supreme Court should abandon the broad, bright-line
Chevron standard reaffirmed by Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in City

124
125

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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of Arlington v. FCC,126 and move toward the provision-by-provision approach
Chief Justice Roberts advocated for in his City of Arlington dissent127 and in
his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.128
Each of these three alternatives will be addressed in turn.
1. The Case for Chevron Deference
The case for Chevron deference in light of legislating in the shadows will
be made briefly here, as it is similar to the case for a more purposivist
approach to agency statutory interpretation set forth in Section II.A. Because
agency officials are often substantially involved in legislative drafting, they
have special expertise and knowledge concerning what Congress intends
when it leaves an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers—or even
whether Congress intended to speak on the policy question at issue. In other
words, as Sitaraman argues, the agency may well “have special insight into
what the goals and intentions behind the legislation actually were, what the
political and practical compromises were, and how [the members of Congress]
thought about specific problems throughout the legislative process.”129
Alongside political accountability and uniformity of federal administrative
law, agency expertise is considered one of the bedrock rationales for Chevron
deference and for why Congress delegates primary interpretive authority to
federal agencies (as opposed to courts).130 Indeed, the Chevron Court itself
emphasized agency expertise as grounds for deference, noting that Congress
perhaps “consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”131
Congress delegates interpretive authority to agencies, instead of generalist
courts, at least in part because those agencies are experts in the subject matter.
126
127
128
129
130

133 S. Ct. 1864, 1874-75 (2013).
Id. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 128.
See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1286-88 (2008)
(“Administrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in particular regulatory fields offers a
second popular justification for Chevron deference.”); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why
Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that “the expertise rationale provides a stronger justification for giving
deference to agency work product than does the implied delegation theory”); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 866 (2001) (“[Chevron] argues that
agencies typically have greater expertise about technical and specialized subjects than do courts.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990)
(“[T]he Chevron approach might well be defended on the ground that the resolution of ambiguities
in statutes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is one of law, narrowly understood, and
that agencies are uniquely well situated to make the relevant policy decisions.”).
131 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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To be sure, Chevron’s expertise justification centered on the agency’s policy
or technical expertise, not necessarily the agency’s expertise in legislative
history or statutory drafting. But that is not true of the case law more generally.
As Justice Scalia noted decades ago, “The cases, old and new, that accept
administrative interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in
question, their intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the
legislation at issue, [and] their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate
those purposes.”132 Justice Breyer has expanded on this “better understanding
of congressional will” rationale for judicial deference:
The agency that enforces the statute may have had a hand in drafting its
provisions. It may possess an internal history in the form of documents or
“handed-down oral tradition” that casts light on the meaning of a difficult
phrase or provision. Regardless, its staff, in close contact with relevant
legislators and staffs, likely understands current congressional views, which,
in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior understandings. At a
minimum, the agency staff understands the sorts of interpretations needed
to “make the statute work.”133

If agency expertise is the touchstone for Chevron deference, the fact that
agencies play such a substantial role in the legislative process certainly bolsters
the deference argument. Indeed, Sitaraman argues that, “at least in some
situations, courts should grant greater deference to agencies” based on their
involvement in the legislative process.134 That said, agency expertise is not
the only rationale for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations.
There are, moreover, additional constitutional and normative concerns against
such delegation of interpretive authority. Those counterarguments are addressed
in subsection II.B.2.
2. The Case Against Chevron Deference
Discontent about Chevron deference has surfaced in the administrative
law literature.135 Such discontent reached the Supreme Court in 2015 in
132

Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.

511, 514.
133 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
368 (1986).
134 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 129.
135 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 315-17 (2014)
(arguing that the courts’ grant of deference to agency interpretations amounts to “abandonment of
judicial office”); Professor Michael Herz et al., Remarks at The New Chevron Skeptics Panel at the
Federalist Society’s 18th Annual Faculty Conference (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/
detail/the-new-chevron-skeptics-event-audiovideo [https://perma.cc/KLP3-4W9S] (exploring skepticism
of Chevron deference). Of course, criticisms of Chevron deference are not necessarily new. Jack Beermann,
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Michigan v. EPA.136 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the
EPA’s “request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality
of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”137
Those constitutional concerns, Justice Thomas explained, involve the transfer
of interpretive authority from courts to federal agencies—“a transfer [that] is
in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power
exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.”138
In light of the findings presented in this Article, however, another opinion
from 2015 may be of even greater importance to the future of Chevron deference.
In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice
Scalia’s prior call for the Court to reconsider Auer deference.139 Auer deference,
which is also referred to as Seminole Rock deference, instructs courts that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is given “controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”140
With John Manning leading the way, a number of scholars have called for
the Court to eliminate this deference doctrine and “replace Seminole Rock with
a standard that imposes an independent judicial check on the agency’s
determination of regulatory meaning.”141 Manning’s foundational critique was
based on separation-of-powers concerns, and he drew on legal principles set
for instance, has long called for its demise because of, among other things, concerns of judicial
administrability and manipulation. See Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing
After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750-51 (2014) (arguing for the Chevron doctrine to
be “jettisoned”); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 850-51 (2010) (arguing that
Chevron is “inconsistent with the APA,” “has not accomplished its goals,” and has “spawned an
increasingly complicated regime”).
136 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts cut back on the breadth of Chevron
in his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell, holding that Chevron deference does not apply to
questions of “deep economic and political significance.” 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax
Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 39-46 (2015) (arguing that the major questions doctrine developed
in King v. Burwell “is a major blow to a bright-line, rule-based approach to Chevron deference”).
137 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138 Id.
139 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“By my best lights, the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.”); accord id. at
1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The opinions of Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”).
140 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
141 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996); see also Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court
and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12 (1996) (asserting that
Auer deference encourages agency rule drafters to be “vague in framing regulations, with the plan
of issuing ‘interpretations’ to create the intended new law without observance of notice and
comment procedures”).
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forth long ago by Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu concerning the
dangerous consolidation of lawmaking and law-execution powers in the same
government actor.
To support this proposition, Manning cites Montesquieu’s warning that
“[w]hen legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or
in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear
that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them
tyrannically.”142 Manning also relied on Locke’s Second Treatise of Government,
pointing to Locke’s proposition that it is “too great a temptation to human
frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons, who have the power of
making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby
they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make.”143 Or, as
Blackstone put it, “where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct
hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power
as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the
liberty of the subject.”144
To address these concerns, Manning argued that courts should abandon Auer
deference and instead apply the less-deferential Skidmore standard, which gives
weight to an agency’s interpretation by “the thoroughness evident in the
[agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”145 As will become clearer when alternatives
to Chevron deference are considered later in this Article, it is worth noting
that Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler have argued in favor of “reserv[ing]
Seminole Rock deference for regulatory interpretations contained in formal
orders (granting Skidmore respect to more informal interpretations).”146
Perhaps motivated by Manning’s critique, Justice Scalia in recent years joined
the scholarly call to revisit Auer deference, observing that “[f]or decades, and
for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the authority to say what
their rules mean.”147 In his concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell

142 Id. (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
1968) (1768)).
143 Id. at 646 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 143, at 76 (C.B.
MacPherson ed., 1980) (1690)).
144 Id. at 648 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142).
145 Id. at 681, 687 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
146 Matthew Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1449, 1504 (2011); see also id. at 1460 (noting that “Professor Manning persuasively argues that this
combination of law-making and law-interpreting functions is actually a reason for serious concern,
one that makes Seminole Rock deference problematic even if one endorses Chevron”).
147 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Telephone Co., Justice Scalia explained his basic concerns with Auer deference,
distinguishing those concerns from Chevron’s foundation,
On the surface, [Auer deference] seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an
a fortiori application—of the rule [announced in Chevron] that we will defer
to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing.
But it is not. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to
the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation).
The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an
agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of
that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule’s meaning. And
though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.148

Justice Scalia went on to flesh out the perverse agency incentives created by
Auer deference that he posited are not present with respect to Chevron deference.
In particular, he argued that “[d]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to
enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive.”149
On the other hand, he also argued, “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power,
in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and
predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.”150
After Justices Alito and Thomas joined Justice Scalia in expressing
interest in reconsidering Auer deference in the 2015 Mortgage Bankers decision,
it seemed only a matter of time before such reconsideration would occur.
Judge Easterbrook identified one petition pending before the Court this Term
as a suitable vehicle for reconsideration of Auer.151 And scholars, including
most recently Sunstein and Vermeule, have come to Auer’s defense.152 Justice
148
149
150
151

131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
See Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I do not think that it would be a prudent use of
this court’s resources to have all nine judges consider how Auer applies to rehabilitation agreements,
when Auer may not be long for this world. The positions taken by the three members of the panel
show that this is one of those situations in which the precise nature of deference (if any) to an
agency’s views may well control the outcome.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016).
152 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716737 [https://perma.cc/32AZ-7E7B].
See also Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 816-17
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Scalia’s passing potentially changed the direction of the Court with respect to
Auer, at least for now.153 Indeed, last year the Court denied review of the
petition Judge Easterbrook had recommended, with only Justice Thomas
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.154 That said, Justice Neil Gorsuch,
whom the Senate recently confirmed to fill Justice Scalia’s vacancy on the
Supreme Court, has expressed his own constitutional concerns with Chevron
deference,155 and he may well have similar concerns about Auer deference.
Regardless whether the Court reconsiders Auer deference, the findings in
this Article on legislating in the shadows potentially extend the arguments
against Auer to implicate Chevron deference as well. Let’s start with the
oversimplified analogy between Auer and Chevron. If the agency is indeed a
partner with Congress in legislative drafting, Justice Scalia’s concern about an
agency legislating and executing the law should apply with some force to
legislative drafting. The executive and legislative functions are, in essence,
combined via legislating in the shadows. The agency often is involved in
drafting—and may be the drafter of—the legislative ambiguities that delegate
interpretive authority to the agency that administers the statute.
This type of agency self-delegation—or agency self-dealing—likewise raises
serious concerns. As Sitaraman has observed, “As is the concern with Seminole
Rock, the agency might be creating opportunities to give itself discretion it can

(2015) (“Overruling Auer would accomplish little beyond removing a useful tool that facilitates
judicial review, increases the predictability of regulatory action, and maintains political
accountability in agency decision-making.”).
153 Christopher Walker, Courts Regulating the Regulators, REG. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://
www.theregreview.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-regulators [https://perma.cc/V2
Y8-VTR2].
154 See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608-09 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“This is the appropriate case in which to reevaluate
Seminole Rock and Auer. But the Court chooses to sit idly by, content to let ‘[h]e who writes a law’
also ‘adjudge its violation.’”). Similarly, when the Court decided to grant review last October in
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., it expressly refused to grant review on the question of whether
to eliminate Auer deference. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369, 369
(2016) (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
granted limited to Questions 2 and 3 presented by the petition.”), vacated and remanded 2017 WL
855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).
155 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time
has come to face the behemoth.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Questions
Gorsuch on Holding Federal Bureaucracy Accountable to the Law (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.
hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=releases&id=4A30B354-85E8-4726-A5D2-61D282AF10EB
[https://perma.cc/8RQA-9VVG] (quoting and linking to Judge Gorsuch’s Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing testimony on Chevron deference).
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abuse.”156 Indeed, because the agency is involved at the outset in drafting the
legislation, Congress’s ability to regulate the bounds of agency delegation is
hindered. Put in principal–agent terms, “If the principal (Congress) cannot
be trusted to provide metes and bounds and to legislate against a background
rule of delegation, an administrative law enterprise built on those foundations
becomes suspect.”157
Moreover, contrary to Justice Scalia’s intuition, the perverse incentives he
identified with respect to judicial deference to agency interpretations of their
own regulations may be similarly present in the legislative process. Chevron
deference “to an agency’s interpretation of a statute does not encourage
Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes.”158 But
it could encourage agencies to draft vague statutes. Indeed, as noted in Part I,
a number of agency officials indicated during the interviews that they often
suggest that legislation be drafted in “broad” or “flexible” terms—in other
words, that terms be left ambiguous—to preserve or enlarge agency discretion
to implement the statute. To rephrase Justice Scalia’s concern, “deferring to an
agency’s interpretation of [a statute it has helped draft] encourages the agency
to [draft] vague [statutes] which give it the power, in future [regulatory
efforts], to do what it pleases.”
To be sure, this is an overly simplistic analogy. Just like the objections
discussed in Section II.A regarding the extension of contract law’s contra
proferentem doctrine to constrain agency statutory interpretation, there are
obvious counterarguments to extending the Auer deference objections to
Chevron deference. First and foremost, any separation-of-power concerns are
much more attenuated. The agencies, after all, do not actually make the law.
Congress retains all legislative power, and the “collective Congress”159 enacts
the legislation in the way it deems appropriate—incorporating the agency’s
suggested language or not. The same is true of legislative language suggested
by lobbyists, interest groups, and other organizations involved in the
legislative process. In other words, the Blackstone-Locke-Montesquieu
structural concerns that Manning (and Justice Scalia) marshaled to attack
Auer deference seem to have little force, at least as a formal constitutional
156 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 126-27. Aaron Nielson makes a similar argument in the context
of Chevron deference to statutory interpretations advanced in agency adjudications. See Aaron L.
Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821341
[https://perma.cc/7HS3-ZTL4].
157 Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 501, 503 (2015) (footnote omitted); see id. at 503-04 (arguing that if Congress cannot
effectively patrol lawmaking delegations to federal agencies, “administrative law may require a
fundamental rethinking”).
158 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
159 This term is borrowed from Rao, supra note 4, at 1465 (“The Constitution creates what I term
the ‘collective Congress’—the people’s representatives may exercise legislative power only collectively.”).
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matter, in the context of Chevron deference and the legislative process.
Legislating via bicameralism and presentment arguably washes away any
constitutional impurities created by agency legislating in the shadows (and
subsequently interpreting that legislation).
Similar counterarguments can be made regarding the perverse incentives
for agencies to insert ambiguities in draft legislation that they will ultimately
interpret. Even if the various agency officials’ responses that federal agencies
generally endeavor to draft legislation in broad, flexible, and ambiguous terms
are representative of the regulatory state as a whole,160 it is again Congress—not
the agency—that ultimately legislates. Indeed, this study only explores
agencies’ perspectives on their role in the legislative process; congressional
drafters may well view the agencies’ role and influence as more limited. Members
of Congress, moreover, can serve as a check on delegation via ambiguity and
may well have incentives to delegate carefully. The collective Congress ultimately
enacts the statute. Thus, at least in theory, any enacted statutory ambiguity is
arguably one that Congress contemplated delegating to the agency to resolve.
The findings from this study cast some empirical doubt on these
theoretical objections regarding incentives.161 During the agency interviews
and the follow-up survey conducted for this study, a consistent theme concerned
the lack of congressional awareness of the existing statutory and regulatory
scheme and the poor quality of legislative drafting by congressional staffers.
Oftentimes these concerns were offered in tandem with a lament about the
turnover among congressional staffers.162 The recommendations ACUS adopted
based on the study reflect this theme: “Although agencies, as a rule, strive to
respond to all requests, they continue to face challenges in providing technical
assistance. Congressional staff may be unfamiliar with an agency’s enabling
legislation and governing statutes.”163
In the follow-up survey, half (50%) of the agency respondents agreed or
strongly agreed, with another two in five (40%) somewhat agreeing, that
“[c]ongressional staffers often are unfamiliar with the agency’s governing statutes
and implementing regulations”—tied for the highest composite score among

160 Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 152 (manuscript at 14) (“For agencies, ambiguities are
a threat at least as much as they are an opportunity. One administration might well want to ensure
that its successor will not be allowed, with the aid of Auer, to shift from a prior position.”).
161 For a more thorough discussion of these findings, see Walker, Federal Agencies in the
Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 32-33.
162 See id. at 33 (discussing the results of Q6(h) of the follow-up survey, in which three in ten
(30%) agency respondents agreed and another two in five (40%) somewhat agreed, with the
remainder (30%) disagreeing, that “[t]he turnover of staff in Congress makes it difficult for the
agency to have a strong working relationship with Congress”).
163 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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the eight challenges listed in the survey.164 The agency officials reported that
congressional staffers often propose legislation that would duplicate existing
law or unintentionally conflict with the existing statutory (and regulatory)
scheme. As an agency rule drafter respondent from the author’s prior survey
put it, “Congress is producing some pretty terrible stuff to work with.”165
Accordingly, much of the work involved in agencies providing technical
drafting assistance consists of educating congressional staffers—and, in turn,
the members of Congress—about what the existing law does and how the
proposed legislation would affect that. Of course, these concerns about
congressional staffer turnover and the poor quality of congressional drafting
are not new and have been well-documented elsewhere.166 There is a reason
that one of the eight recommendations ACUS adopted focuses on agency
educational efforts of congressional staffers and their bosses.167 If the agency
perceptions are accurate regarding the quality of congressional drafting and
of congressional awareness of existing law, confidence in Congress reining in
legislating in the shadows to avoid agency self-dealing seems misplaced.
Putting aside the empirical challenges to the argument that Congress has
the capacity to check the agency incentives implicated by legislating in the
shadows, political scientists and economists have long theorized that individual
members of Congress—and the congressional committees on which they
serve—may have incentives to delegate by ambiguity distinct from an
institutional desire to divide labor and leverage agency expertise or to otherwise
minimize the costs of legislating.168 As Rao has explained, the political science
164 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing Q6(g),
which shows that the remainder (10%) disagreed, with no one disagreeing strongly).
165 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1029 n.136.
166 See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 846 (2014) (“For example, all except for two House committees
had staff retention rates below 60% in the period between 2009 and 2011, a period in which control
of the House passed from Democrats to Republicans.”).
167 See Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“To improve
the quality of proposed legislation and strengthen their relations with Congress, agencies should be
actively engaged in educational efforts, including in-person briefings and interactions, to educate
Congressional staff about the agencies’ respective statutory and regulatory frameworks and agency
technical drafting expertise.”).
168 See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS
(1999) (offering extensive literature review). As Epstein and O’Halloran observe, “Congress will
delegate to the executive when the external transaction costs of doing so are less than the internal
transaction costs of making policy through the normal legislative process via committees.” Id. at 43;
see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1721, 1744 (2002) (“The ubiquity of delegation is due to the need for (a) authority and (b) division
of labor, in any complex institution, whether public or private. All institutions must take direction
from a person, or a small group of people, but the leader of an institution cannot possibly perform
all of its tasks directly. Instead, the leader or principal delegates broad authority to agents.”).
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and economics literature “emphasizes the many benefits that members of
Congress can realize through delegation and demonstrates the strong
incentives individual legislators have to continue delegating, even though this
might weaken the collective lawmaking power of Congress.”169
In addition to minimizing legislation costs, the benefits of delegating
policymaking authority to federal agencies include shifting responsibility for
the negative consequences of policy decisions to the agency (while still
claiming responsibility for the positive outcomes that occur at the agency
level); providing benefits for particular constituents in ways that may please
donors and thus encourage campaign contributions; and avoiding specification
where legislative compromise proves too costly.170 As Rao argues, moreover,
many of these incentives provide “a variety of individual benefits [to members
of Congress] outside of the legislative process” in ways that may frustrate the
goals of the collective Congress.171
Through ex post controls, members of Congress, and the congressional
committees composed of members, can exercise post-delegation influence on
agency policymaking—to the benefit of constituents, interest groups, and
potential campaign donors in ways that may contravene the will of the collective
Congress.172 Based on the variety of tools that members (and committees) of
Congress have to influence agency policymaking after delegation, Rao posits
that this “influence and control of administration by members of Congress
allows lawmakers to also serve as law interpreters, in contravention of basic
separation-of-powers principles.”173 This unique relationship between federal
agencies and individual members of Congress can lead to what Rao has coined
“administrative collusion”; “[b]y fracturing the collective Congress and
empowering individual members, delegation also promotes collusion between
members of Congress and administrative agencies.”174
169
170

Rao, supra note 4, at 1477 (footnote omitted).
See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 168, at 30-32 (describing a number of reasons
Congress might have incentivizes to delegate to agencies in particular issue areas when it does not
do so in others: spending increased time on constituent services; being able to intervene in the
administrative process on behalf of constituents; or being able to threaten uncooperative constituents
with harmful regulation if they do not contribute to the legislator’s reelection campaign).
171 Rao, supra note 4, at 1481; see id. (detailing how the individual interests of members of Congress
may be served by delegation—providing members an opportunity to intervene in the regulatory process
on behalf of interest groups and constituents; and reducing the time and costs of legislation so members
can spend more time engaging in activities that will improve their chances of reelection).
172 See id. at 1482 (“Methods [of ex post controls] take a variety of official forms, including
committee oversight, threats to reduce appropriations, investigations of administrative conduct,
reporting requirements, and the confirmation process for high-level officials.”).
173 Id. at 1498.
174 Id. at 1504; see also id. at 1505-06 (“Delegations thus erode one of the primary mechanisms
for controlling the government by undermining the structural rivalry between members of Congress
and the executive. Instead of competing over delegation, they will often agree on open-ended
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The unconventional principal–agent bureaucratic model that emerges—where
the individual member or congressional committee and not the collective
Congress is the principal—is further complicated by federal agencies’
provision of technical drafting assistance. As Sitaraman observes, “[i]n many
cases, the executive [agency] may assist Congress in suggesting what topics
are worthy of delegation, how much power to delegate, how that power might
be used, and what resources are necessary to execute on the delegation.”175
That the agency confers with the member of Congress in the shadows at the
outset of the legislative process further facilitates this risk of administrative
collusion. Not only does the federal agency have incentives to suggest
legislative language that is broad, flexible, or otherwise ambiguous in order
to preserve or expand the agency’s regulatory and interpretive authority, the
individual member of Congress faces similar incentives. And both share
incentives to collude to delegate policymaking authority to the agency
through ambiguity. That the initial legislative-drafting discussions occur in
secret certainly does not help to check these incentives.
In sum, the relationship between individual members of Congress (and
congressional committees) and federal agencies may elevate the risk that
legislating in the shadows leads to excessive delegation of interpretive and
policymaking authority in ways that contravene the will of the collective
Congress. In so doing, both individual members of Congress and federal
agencies are able to exercise lawmaking and law-interpreting authority in
ways similar to those that concerned Scalia and Manning as to Auer deference.
One solution, which Manning (and Stephenson and Pogoriler176) suggested
in the context of combatting the concerns caused by Auer deference, is simply
to switch to the less-deferential Skidmore doctrine.177
Appreciating the difference between Chevron and Skidmore helps underscore
how transitioning to the less-deferential Skidmore standard may help alleviate
the concerns addressed in this Part.178 Although both Skidmore and Chevron
are often referred to as “deference” standards, Peter Strauss has helpfully

delegations of authority to agencies in order to expand the discretionary power of the legislator and
administrators.”).
175 Sitaraman, supra note 13, at 125-26.
176 See Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, supra note 146, at 1504 (arguing to “reserve Seminole Rock
deference for regulatory interpretations contained in formal orders (granting Skidmore respect to
more informal interpretations)”).
177 See Manning, supra note 141, at 618 (contending that Skidmore constitutes an appropriate
framework “for circumstances in which an agency is interpreting a legal text, but is not exercising
delegated interpretive lawmaking power”).
178 The following paragraphs draw from the author’s prior work. See Christopher J. Walker,
How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 78-79 (2013) [hereinafter Walker,
The Deference Lottery].
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reframed these standards as “Chevron space” and “Skidmore weight.”179 An
agency receives Chevron space to fill in holes in statutes it administers because
Congress has delegated authority for the agency to be “the authoritative
interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes.”180 As Strauss puts
it, under Chevron “the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports
match, is to see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and
that the game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts themselves
to play the game.”181 Chevron space thus seems to reflect separation-of-powers
values, in that “Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than
the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”182
Skidmore weight, by contrast, does not give agencies delegated space to be
authoritative interpreters.183 Strauss explains that Skidmore weight “addresses the
possibility that an agency’s view on a given statutory question may in itself
warrant respect by judges who themselves have ultimate interpretive authority.”184
“[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,” as the
Skidmore Court itself explained, “[t]he weight of [a Skidmore-eligible agency
interpretation] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”185 In such circumstances, the court—not the agency—remains the
authoritative interpreter.
The agency, however, retains the power to persuade based on its special
knowledge and experience that may qualify it as an expert of statutory
179 See generally Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17 (contending that Skidmore
and Chevron “weight” are terms that more accurately describe the way that the judiciary views the
constraints on administrative agencies). This reformulation is grounded in terms the Court has
sometimes used to describe the standards. For instance, the Skidmore Court itself explained that
agency interpretations subject to Skidmore, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority,” are given “weight” based on their “power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Similarly, Justice Scalia explained in his Mead dissent that ambiguities in
statutes subject to Chevron “create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency
discretion.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
181 Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17, at 1145.
182 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996); see also Walker, Avoiding Normative
Canons, supra note 94, at 173-82 (exploring in more detail Chevron’s separation-of-powers foundation).
183 Typically there is no Chevron space afforded for one of two reasons: either Congress has
not delegated interpretive authority to the agency; or Congress has delegated such space, but the
agency has “cho[sen] not to exercise that authority, but rather to guide—to indicate desired
directions without undertaking (as [it] might) to compel them.” Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing,
supra note 17, at 1145.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1154 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
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meaning and purpose. As the author has noted in prior work that now takes
on additional significance in light of the empirical findings in this study, “the
agency may have been present during the legislative drafting (and may actually
have assisted in drafting), and the agency likely has extensive, nationwide
experience in implementing the statute.”186 Indeed, if the persuasiveness turns
on the agency’s involvement in the legislative process—be it either substantive
or technical legislative assistance—the agency would be encouraged to reveal
its involvement. In other words, the agency can choose to “buy” Skidmore
weight by providing details of its legislative involvement.187 As discussed in
Section III.A, this increased transparency may well have independent value
for administrative governance.
Strauss further elaborates additional reasons why agencies have power to
persuade distinct from regular litigants:
It is not only that agencies have the credibility of their circumstances, but
also that they can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally
uniform understanding of the law that would be disrupted by the variable
results to be expected from a geographically and politically diverse judiciary
encountering the hardest . . . issues with little experience with the overall
scheme and its patterns.188

Put differently, the weight of an agency’s interpretation should be heavier
than the ordinary litigant’s power to persuade. Indeed, Skidmore weight can
take into account one of the common rationales for Chevron deference—the
need for uniformity in federal administrative law.
The concerns raised by legislating in the shadows—and the recommendation
to replace Chevron space with Skidmore weight—take on added significance in
light of the empirical realities of agency rulemaking, as revealed in the
author’s prior study on agency rule drafters. Among more than twenty
interpretive tools included in the survey, Chevron deference was reported by
most (90%) agency rule drafters as being used when interpreting statutes and
drafting regulations.189
The vast majority of agency rule drafters surveyed think about judicial
review when drafting statutes and understand Chevron and Skidmore and how
their chances in court are better under Chevron. “Indeed, two in five rule
drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed—and another two in five
somewhat agreed—that a federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive

186
187
188
189

Walker, The Deference Lottery, supra note 178, at 79.
Thanks to Zach Clopton for this excellent observation.
Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 17, at 1146.
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1020 fig.2.
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efforts if it is confident that Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore
deference or de novo review) applies.”190
By comparison, whereas nine in ten (90%) agency rule drafters surveyed
indicated that they use Chevron deference when interpreting statutes and
drafting regulations, only about two in five (39%) indicated that they use Auer
deference.191 In other words, any concerns about perverse incentives for
agency regulators caused by Auer deference may be much less pervasive than
concerns as to the incentives caused by Chevron deference.192
Accordingly, agencies have incentives to draft statutes flexibly, broadly, and
ambiguously to trigger Chevron deference—and thus engage in self-delegation
of primary interpretive authority. These agencies have further incentives to
be more aggressive in their agency statutory interpretations when they
believe Chevron deference applies. This creates incentives that the Chevron
Court and the current Court have likely never considered. Legislating in the
shadows must be understood and considered when discussing to what degree
courts should defer to agency statutory interpretations. It might make sense
to abandon Chevron space altogether and turn to Skidmore weight, which
focuses more on the agency’s expertise in the subject matter and in the
legislative process leading up to the statute’s enactment. In some ways, as
further discussed in Section III.C, judicial review under Skidmore would look
a lot like judicial review of agency statutory interpretation conducted under
the more purposivist approach articulated in Section II.A.
3. The Case for a More Limited Chevron Deference
Despite the suggestion in subsection II.B.2 to abandon Chevron deference
and replace it with the less-deferential Skidmore standard, the Supreme Court
is unlikely to abandon Chevron deference in its entirety any time soon.

190 Id. at 163; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721-28 (2014) (exploring these findings in greater detail).
191 Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1061 fig.11; see also Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 152 (manuscript at 13) (discussing these findings in defending Auer deference).
192 Chevron deference was also the interpretive tool identified as being used by the most
congressional drafters in the Bressman and Gluck study. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note
18, at 993 fig.10. One could argue whether congressional drafters are well aware that Chevron
deference—in particular, that if they leave ambiguities in statutes, agencies become the authoritative
interpreters—means that Congress should be careful about leaving ambiguities in statutory
language. The idea of careful drafting to avoid delegation is in tension with the political science and
economic literature discussed above. On the other hand, this widespread awareness of Chevron
deference also suggests that congressional drafters understand how to better collude with their
agency counterparts while legislating in the shadows.
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Congress, of course, could also act.193 Indeed, the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act, which passed the House in 2017, would amend the judicial
review section of the Administrative Procedure Act to instruct courts to
“decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies.”194 In
other words, the proposed legislation would purport to get rid of both
Chevron and Auer deference.195 As of May 2017, unsurprisingly, only one
Democrat joined the Republicans in sponsoring the bill in the House,196 and
only five House Democrats voted in favor of it.197 It is unlikely to be enacted,
though it will be interesting to see what the Senate and new presidential
administration decide to do.
There are strong arguments, moreover, that wholesale abandonment of
Chevron deference to address legislating in the shadows is similar to using a
hammer when a screwdriver would be more appropriate. This is particularly
true in light of our inability to empirically assess the extent to which Congress
incorporates agency technical drafting assistance and the extent to which such
assistance creates statutory ambiguity in an agency self-dealing fashion.
Perhaps the concerns about legislating in the shadows can be addressed more
narrowly and effectively. For instance, Shobe, when considering the role of
federal agencies in both substantive and technical legislative drafting, argues
that courts should “be more willing to move away from Chevron deference,
absent other indicators, in situations where the body of Congress responsible
for the legislation was from a political party different than the party of the
President that Congress expects to be implementing the legislation.”198 Shobe
bases this conclusion in part on the literature that posits that Congress is
193 Indeed, as Kent Barnett has documented, Congress has on at least one occasion—in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 regarding preemption
decisions by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—codified Skidmore deference in lieu of
Chevron deference. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015); see also
Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise within Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 587, 605 (2014) (noting that Congress could codify Chevron deference when agencies follow
certain procedures or certain contingencies occur).
194 H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (as passed by House, Jan. 11, 2017); see also S. 2724, 114th
Cong. § 2 (2016) (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 17, 2016) (proposing the same standard of review
with similar statutory language).
195 For more on the legislation, see Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron
Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1098-1105 (2016) [hereinafter Walker, Context-Specific Chevron Deference].
196 See Cosponsors: H.R.5—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/SQ38-XBU5] (listing
the twenty-four House Republican cosponsors and single Democratic cosponsor of a bill containing
the Separation of Powers Restoration Act).
197 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 45, CONGRESS.GOV, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/
roll045.xml [https://perma.cc/QVT2-2B5J] (listing the 223 House Republicans that voted for the bill
containing the Separation of Powers Restoration Act alongside only five House Democratic members).
198 Shobe, supra note 13, at 510.
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more likely to delegate interpretive authority to an ally (unified government)
than a foe (divided government).199 In circumstances of divided government,
Shobe also suggests that the reviewing court should apply Skidmore weight
instead of Chevron space.200
Although perhaps worth considering for other reasons, Shobe’s specific
proposal seems unlikely to address the perverse incentives created by
legislating in the shadows discussed in Section II.B that may result from
administrative collusion between a member of Congress and the agency
providing the legislative-drafting assistance. That administrative collusion
would likely take place in unified and divided government. But Shobe’s
proposal to change Chevron deference from a broad, bright-line rule to a
context-specific one may help address these concerns.
Instead of applying Chevron deference to statutory ambiguity whenever
Congress has delegated general rulemaking or formal adjudicatory authority
to the agency (and the agency has utilized that procedure to adopt the
statutory interpretation), the reviewing court could assess whether the
collective Congress reasonably intended to delegate by ambiguity that
particular issue to the agency. The court would inquire whether the ambiguity
seems like a deliberate delegation by the collective Congress, or whether it
seems more like the result of administrative collusion during the legislative
process—or even just legislative inadvertence—that the collective Congress
would not have intended to result in a delegation of interpretive authority to
the agency. In other words, the Chevron Step Zero inquiry would focus not
just on the formality of the agency procedure creating the interpretation but
also on whether the collective Congress intended to delegate that particular
substantive question to the agency.201 Such an approach would also encourage
199 Id. at 509-12 & nn.256-64. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 168, at 122-62 (confirming
the hypothesis that as the preferences of Congress and the President diverge, Congress will delegate
less discretionary authority to agencies); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2016) (asserting that the “competition” between the
legislative and executive branch “var[ies] significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether
the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party”); Matthew C. Stephenson,
Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (2011) (discussing that “a
principal is willing to delegate more discretion to an agent with expected policy preferences similar to
the principal’s own—a hypothesis sometimes referred to as the ‘ally principal’”).
200 Shobe, supra note 13, at 511 n.265.
201 For more on Chevron Step Zero, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873-88 (2001), which delineates three operating principles that courts
should follow in resolving questions about Chevron’s domain. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207-11 (2006) (discussing the applicability of the Chevron framework
and potential approaches to a Chevron Step Zero analysis). See generally Peter M. Shane &
Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 475, 477-84 (2014) (reviewing recent literature and case law on the scope of Chevron
deference under Step Zero).
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the collective Congress to be more explicit when intending to delegate
interpretive authority to a federal agency.
If this case-by-case approach to Chevron deference sounds familiar, it may
be because Chief Justice Roberts suggested something quite similar in his
dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC202 and his opinion for the Court in King v.
Burwell.203 In 2013, the Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC, which held
that Chevron deference applies to statutory ambiguity concerning the scope of
an agency’s regulatory authority (or jurisdiction).204 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, framed the inquiry of whether Chevron
deference applies to statutory ambiguity in broad and bright-line terms: “the
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has
unambiguously vested the [agency] with general authority to administer the
[statute] through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation
at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”205
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, dissented.
The dissent bemoaned the sprawl of the modern administrative state and how
“[t]he Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal
bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our
economic, social, and political activities.”206 To combat this administrative
power, the Chief Justice argued that Chevron deference should not apply to
every statutory ambiguity whenever Congress has granted the agency general
rulemaking or adjudicatory power.207 Instead, quoting the Chevron decision
itself, the Chief Justice argued that the reviewing court should evaluate
“whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute.’”208 The Chief Justice then documented how
the Court has “never faltered in [its] understanding of this straightforward
principle, that whether a particular agency interpretation warrants Chevron
deference turns on the court’s determination whether Congress has delegated
to the agency the authority to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue.”209
202 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1881 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(suggesting that courts analyze whether Congress delegated authority to the agency to elucidate a
“specific provision” of the statute to determine whether Chevron deference applies).
203 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-99 (2015) (asserting that the application of
Chevron deference is premised on the theory that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps). This discussion of the Chief Justice’s approach to Chevron
deference draws substantially from, and is further explored in, the author’s prior work. See Walker,
Context-Specific Chevron Deference, supra note 195, at 1098-1105.
204 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75.
205 Id. at 1874.
206 Id. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1879-80.
208 Id. at 1881 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-84 (1984)).
209 Id.; see also id. at 1881-83 (reviewing precedent on point).
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In response, Justice Scalia sharpened the distinction between these two
approaches to Chevron deference. Justice Scalia called the dissent’s approach
“a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence” because, under the dissent’s
“open-ended hunt for congressional intent,” “even when general rulemaking
authority is clear, every agency rule [would] be subjected to a de novo judicial
determination of whether the particular issue was committed to agency
discretion.”210 For Justice Scalia, the dissent’s context-specific approach would
result in “some sort of totality-of-the-circumstances test—which is really, of
course, not a test at all but an invitation to make an ad hoc judgment regarding
congressional intent.”211 Accordingly, he argued, “The excessive agency power
that the dissent fears would be replaced by chaos.”212
Not surprisingly, Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, agreed with
the dissent’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference.213 He provided
additional guidance on how to determine if Congress had intended to
delegate interpretive authority to the agency by ambiguity.214 Drawing on his
opinion for the Court in Barnhart v. Walton, Justice Breyer noted that the
Court has previously “assessed ‘the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
time.’”215 Justice Breyer also noted the relevance of the statutory provision’s
subject matter—“its distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties or
its falling within the scope of another agency’s authority.”216
In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, continued
to develop his context-specific approach in City of Arlington.217 Although the
Court ultimately sided with the federal government in interpreting the
Affordable Care Act’s tax credit provisions, it refused to accord any deference
to the regulation interpreting the statute. Like he did in his City of Arlington
dissent, the Chief Justice noted that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may

210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 1874 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).
Id. at 1875-76 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265-66 (2006); Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1007-10 (1999)).
217 See, e.g., Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 41 (observing that “the Chief’s case-by-case
approach [in King v. Burwell] of looking to the particular statutory subsection for congressional intent
of delegation (at least for major questions) reads a lot like his dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC”).
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be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an
implicit delegation.”218 The Chief Justice went on to explain,
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms,
involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of
health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available
on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political
significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.219

The Chief Justice further observed that “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in
crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”220
Similar to the Chief Justice’s dissent in City of Arlington, this new major
questions doctrine departs from the bright-line, rule-based approach to Chevron
deference that Justice Scalia rearticulated for the Court in City of Arlington.
To be sure, the major questions doctrine is not new. Even Justice Scalia has
invoked it, colorfully explaining that the doctrine is the presumption that
Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms of ancillary positions—it does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”221
Its application here, however, seems less obvious and indicative of a more
general context-specific inquiry into congressional intent.222
To the extent the Chief Justice is looking for more support for a context-specific
approach to Chevron deference, the findings from this study may well provide
it. Strengthening Chevron Step Zero to inquire whether the collective Congress
“had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the

218 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
219 Id. at 2489. At oral argument Justice Kennedy suggested adopting such an approach while
discussing Chevron deference: “it seems to me a drastic step for us to say that the Department of
Internal Revenue and its director can make this call one way or the other when there are, what,
billions of dollars of subsidies involved here?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
220 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
221 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
222 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major Questions
Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2017) (exploring further the origins of the new major
questions doctrine in King v. Burwell and how that doctrine differs from prior precedent). Despite
the novelty of Chief Justice’s approach to major questions in King v. Burwell, it does find some
support from the agency rule drafters surveyed in the author’s prior study. See Walker, Inside Agency
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1053-58 & fig.10 (reporting that approximately half (56%) of
the agency rule drafters surveyed—compared to about a quarter (28%) of congressional respondents
in the Bressman and Gluck study—believed that Congress intends to delegate ambiguities relating
to major policy questions). For a further explanation of these findings, see Walker, Context-Specific
Chevron Deference, supra note 195, at 1105-14.
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statute’”223 would help prevent administrative collusion between members of
Congress and the federal agencies that together legislate in the shadows. This
more limited Chevron doctrine would also likely encourage the collective
Congress to more expressly indicate its intent to delegate by ambiguity.
Moreover, unlike abandoning Chevron deference entirely, as suggested
in subsection II.B.2, it is more realistic that the Court will adopt a more
context-specific approach to Chevron. Based on the opinions in City of Arlington,
Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy are already on board for the Chief Justice’s
context-specific approach. Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor also
joined the Chief Justice’s opinion in King v. Burwell—though one would be
wise not to read too much into their decision to join the Chief Justice’s opinion.224
Additionally, Justice Thomas is now concerned that Chevron deference is
unconstitutional and thus may be inclined to adopt a move to limit Chevron’s
domain.225 The same is true of the newest addition to the Court—Justice
Gorsuch—who expressed constitutional concerns with Chevron deference
while serving on the Tenth Circuit.226
III. TRANSPARENCY, DEFERENCE, AND TRADEOFFS
As opposed to reworking judicial review of agency statutory interpretation,
the simpler solution may be to require that agency technical drafting
assistance take place in the sunshine instead of the shadows. Or perhaps to
increase political accountability it should at least be more closely monitored
223 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1881 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-84 (1984)).
224 First, it is unclear whether the Court or lower courts will extend King v. Burwell’s “sweeping
change in administrative law to other regulatory contexts” or whether “this new major questions
doctrine may well be good for tax only.” See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 46. Second, the
Court’s four more liberal members may have joined the Chief Justice’s opinion to uphold the
Affordable Care Act but not necessarily agreed with the Chief Justice’s reasoning on Chevron
deference. See Adam Liptak, Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/supreme-court-tacks-left-with-push-fromdisciplined-liberals.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PFC9-SMTU]. Their “discipline” in voting together
to achieve desired outcomes may mask disagreements on reasoning and interpretation. Id.
225 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
the agency’s “request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality of our broader
practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes”). Justice Thomas may be unwilling
to join the Chief Justice’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference. However, since Thomas
likely believes Chevron is unconstitutional, he might concur in judgment to a Roberts plurality opinion
that significantly altered Chevron. Thomas’s fifth vote would make the Roberts plurality opinion the
narrowest and thus the precedential opinion.
226 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time
has come to face the behemoth.”).
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by the President through OMB preclearance and coordination—similar to
the agency’s substantive legislative activities. After all, core principles of the
modern administrative state include transparency, accountability, and open
governance. Sections III.A and III.B briefly consider and reject these
arguments. Section III.C then introduces the “double deference” problem
that emerges if one accepts a more purposivist approach to agency statutory
interpretation that does not eliminate, or at least narrow, Chevron deference.
A. Against Transparency
As outlined in Section I.B, the current norm is that the congressional
requester expects the technical drafting assistance request and the agency
response to remain confidential. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, based on a
somewhat odd set of facts, has held that certain agency technical drafting
assistance is not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
because it is a congressional, as opposed to agency, record.227 As detailed in
Section II.B, moreover, this secrecy exacerbates the risk of administrative
collusion in the legislative process.
It is thus no surprise that a common response to the findings presented in
this Article is to suggest that technical drafting assistance should be public and
on the record. C. Boyden Gray’s reaction is representative:
There should be more disclosure of what Congress does as to agency
interpretation. . . . [A]ll contacts by Congress with OMB and with the agencies
be logged . . . . Obviously there are incentives . . . for Congressmen and
Senators to leave things vague so that they can go back in and trade a fix for
it for a little campaign donation here, a little help here, a little PAC here.228

This open-governance suggestion finds some support in the administrative
law literature. After all, transparency has long been recognized as a core value to
promote accountability in the regulatory state. For instance, Peter Shane has
227 See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In this circuit,
whether the IRS response is subject to FOIA turns on whether Congress manifested a clear intent
to control the document. Applying that standard to the circumstances of this case and balancing
Congress’s authority to maintain the confidentiality of its own materials against the broad mandate
of disclosure lying at the heart of FOIA, we conclude that only those portions of the IRS response
that would reveal the congressional request are not subject to FOIA.”). But see id. at 605 (Henderson,
J., dissenting) (“I believe the district court correctly analyzed the four factors set forth in Tax Analysts
to conclude that the IRS does not have sufficient ‘control’ of its copy of its response to the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT)’s request to make the document disclosable as an ‘agency record’
under FOIA.” (footnote omitted)).
228 See C. Boyden Gray, Remarks at the Separation of Powers: Congress, Agencies, and the
Court Panel at George Mason University Center for the Study of the Administrative State’s 2016
Public Policy Conference on Rethinking Judicial Deference, at 45:00 (June 2, 2016), https://vimeo.
com/169757569 [https://perma.cc/74AD-WBZK] (responding to an earlier draft of this Article).
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noted that “the openness of agency decision making to public scrutiny—the relative
transparency in terms of process—is itself a guarantee of public accountability.”229
Indeed, Adrian Vermeule has aptly observed that “transparency deters officials
from engaging in self-interest[ed] bargaining,”230 such as, perhaps, the type
of self-dealing concerns implicated by legislating in the shadows.
Although public disclosure may be the simplest solution to the problems
of legislating in the shadows, the costs of such an on-the-record requirement are
too great. As Frederick Schauer has explained, “Transparency is not, of course,
an unalloyed good, much of contemporary popular rhetoric notwithstanding.”231
Indeed, he notes, “Secrecy, privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality also have
their virtues, and we can all understand why transparency is a far more
desirable attribute for sunroom windows than it is for bathroom doors.”232
Here, confidentiality likely encourages congressional drafters to leverage
agency expertise to draft better, more technically correct legislation. A public
disclosure requirement, in contrast, would likely discourage Congress from
even consulting with agencies at an early stage in the legislative process—when
the legislation is more easily reworked and thus where input from agency
subject-matter experts is most valuable. Such a disclosure requirement would
be even more problematic if other outside drafters, such as lobbyists and
229 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 160 (2009); accord ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 6 (2007) (noting that “[t]ransparency is necessary, at least
to some degree, to any conception of accountability”); Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former
Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 364-65 (2014) (explaining why the lack of transparency poses problems for
administrative governance); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1161 (2010) (arguing that “[i]ncreasing transparency regarding
presidential influence on a particular agency decision . . . could facilitate a public dialogue where
citizens are persuaded that the decision made . . . is still the correct decision for the country,” whereas
“submerging presidential preferences undermines electoral accountability for agency decisions and
reduces the chances of a public dialogue on policy”); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source
of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2259 (2016) (noting in a different regulatory context that
“there are costs to the current system of opacity with respect to accountability”).
230 VERMEULE, supra note 229, at 181.
231 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1342.
232 Id.; see id. at 1346-51 (discussing aims, costs, benefits, and tradeoffs of transparency); see also
Mendelson, supra note 229, at 1166-68 (detailing the potential concerns associated with greater public
disclosure). Indeed, there is a large literature outside of law that focuses on the costs of transparency
in governance. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 389
(2010) (“Transparency is a highly regarded value, a precept used for ideological purposes, and a
subject of academic study. . . . [Nonetheless, t]ransparency is overvalued. Moreover, its ideological
usages cannot be justified, because a social science analysis shows that transparency cannot fulfill the
functions its advocates assign to it, although it can play a limited role in their service.”); Justin Fox,
Government Transparency and Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23, 24 (2007) (determining the “specific
conditions under which making the policy process more open can have a deleterious effect on the
public’s welfare”); Justin Fox & Richard Van Weelden, Costly Transparency, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 142, 142
(2012) (identifying “conditions under which [transparency] can decrease the principal’s welfare”).
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interest groups, could continue to provide confidential feedback. The tradeoff
of less transparency for an increased likelihood that technical drafting assistance
actually takes place is likely an efficient one. Indeed, ACUS appeared to
conclude as much when it recommended that that “[c]ongressional committees
and individual Members should aim to reach out to agencies for technical
assistance early in the legislative drafting process.”233
This cost–benefit analysis in favor of confidentiality becomes even more
compelling when one considers reasonable alternatives that produce somewhat
similar benefits and impose substantially fewer costs. Namely, as discussed in
Section II.B, we could rethink how courts review agency statutory interpretations.
The elimination of Chevron deference—or at least its narrowing—would not
discourage agencies from being substantially involved in the legislative process.
But it would mitigate the perverse incentives agencies may have to legislate
in the shadows in a self-dealing fashion. Moreover, such a solution would
encourage members of Congress and federal agencies to maintain a rich
dialogue and effective principal–agent relationship, which should lead to
better legislative and regulatory outputs.
B. Against Presidential Preclearance
If one remains concerned about accountability yet agrees that public
disclosure would prove too costly, another option would be to increase White
House review. Currently, OMB does not require preclearance of agency
technical drafting assistance, only post-assistance notice.234 The findings of
this study, moreover, suggest that OMB is seldom kept in the loop even
though Circular A-19 requires such notice.235 Increased OMB review would
perhaps help remedy accountability problems without requiring full public
transparency. Indeed, some may well argue that the President has a
constitutional duty to supervise agency legislating in the shadows, perhaps to
avoid the Blackstone-Locke-Montesquieu structural separation-of-powers
concerns implicated by administrative collusion in the legislative process.236
233
234
235

Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).
OMB Circular A-19, supra note 23, § 7(i).
See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 10 (finding “that the
majority of agencies do not comply with these [post-assistance notice] instructions with respect to
the run-of-the-mill technical drafting assistance requests” and that, “based on information gathered
from the federal agencies, it does not appear that OMB has made any systematic effort to enforce
these notice and transmittal requirements”).
236 Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842 (2015)
(arguing that “the Constitution embodies a duty to supervise that current doctrine has simply failed
to acknowledge” and that “[a] version of the duty based on Article II demands [presidential]
supervision by and within the executive branch”). To be sure, Professor Metzger has not argued that
the President should supervise agency technical drafting assistance. Moreover, from her comments
on an earlier draft of this Article, she does not seem to perceive a constitutional problem with agency
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Conversely, there is an extensive literature setting forth the normative
problems with current White House review of agency rulemaking and other
regulatory activities.237 Two of those problems, as Lisa Heinzerling has explored
in greater detail, are particularly important here: the lack of transparency in the
OMB review process and the lack of accountability for OMB decisionmaking.238
Moreover, Judge Posner’s criticism of another proposal for OMB to be more
involved in coordinating interagency adjudication activities seems applicable
here as well: “what would paralyze federal regulation would be for White House
staff to attempt to regulate the relations among the agencies. It would be a
bureaucratic disaster.”239 “The result would be to slow down enforcement and
foment bickering,” he continued, adding that “[b]ureaucrats would be locking
horns” and “[h]igher officials in the immense White House staff would be
called in to arbitrate the disputes” in a way that “would make things worse.”240
In the interviews and surveying conducted for this study, agency officials
raised similar criticisms of OMB’s current practices to review agency
legislative activities yet also seemed to universally reject the proposal for
OMB preclearance or other review of technical drafting assistance.241
legislating in the shadows—at least not based on an analogy to the Scalia–Manning Auer deference
concerns outlined in subsection II.B.2. Perhaps most importantly, as further discussed below, the
lack of White House preclearance of technical drafting assistance does not mean the President
provides no supervision. Political appointees in the agency’s legislative affairs office serve as
gatekeepers and liaisons with Congress to control agency interactions with Congress.
237 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006) (casting
doubt on the assertion that White House involvement promotes regulatory effectiveness, at least as
it relates to the EPA); Heinzerling, supra note 229 (describing the OIRA process as it operates in
relation to the EPA); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987) (arguing for more stringent limitations on ex parte attempts by the
President and his staff to influence rulemaking); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (suggesting that the
system of OMB control “imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased health and
safety of the American public”); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001) (exploring policy considerations that
counsel against giving the President authority to dictate decisions entrusted to executive officers by
statute); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH.
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012) (arguing that “centralized White House regulatory review is a
primary cause of regulatory failure that the nation can well do without”).
238 See Heinzerling, supra note 229, at 364-65 (criticizing the opacity of the OIRA process).
239 See POSNER, supra note 18, at 46 (discussing Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency
Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015)).
240 Id.
241 See Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process, supra note 1, at 33 (“These comments
ranged from complaints about how slow and burdensome the OMB preclearance is, and how
antiquated the current guidelines are (they have not been updated in over three decades), to how
there is no clear standard to distinguish between technical and substantive legislative assistance, and
how the notice and transmittal requirements for technical assistance are honored in the breach and/or
should be formally abandoned. Many agency officials, however, also countered that Circular A-19
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Similar to the costs of public disclosure, presidential review could also
discourage congressional staffers from seeking technical drafting assistance—out
of fear that the President would intervene to disrupt a legislative initiative
before it had even begun. (This is not to mention that congressional staffers
expect quick turnarounds on technical drafting assistance requests, and OMB
review would no doubt frustrate that expectation.) Moreover, the benefits of
a formalized OMB process seem to be overstated. After all, the lack of White
House preclearance of technical drafting assistance does not mean the President
does no supervision—at least with respect to executive branch agencies. The
President’s political appointees in the agency’s legislative affairs office serve
as gatekeepers and liaisons with Congress to ensure more political oversight
of agency interactions with Congress.
In sum, the substantial costs of presidential review of legislating in the
shadows would likely outweigh any benefits. And those benefits would likely
not include reducing the incentives for agency self-dealing. To the contrary,
one could imagine the White House utilizing technical drafting assistance to
further shift power to the executive branch in ways that may not be possible
through the political process.
C. Against Double Deference
This Part considers alternatives to rethinking judicial deference doctrines
in light of the phenomenon of legislating in the shadows. It is worth noting
one further complication that likely merits a more extended treatment: the
problem of “double deference.” As discussed in Section II.A, there has been
a growing call among administrative law scholars to allow federal agencies to
engage in more purposivist statutory interpretation, as compared to their judicial
counterparts, given agencies’ comparative expertise in legislative history and
the legislative process that resulted in the statute being enacted.242 The findings
presented in this Article provide some empirical support for that scholarly call.
Embracing a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation
without revisiting Chevron deference, however, could result in a double deference
phenomenon that has not been previously appreciated. In other words, the
reviewing court would allow an agency to have more purposivist leeway (or
deference) in interpreting statutory text based on the agency’s superior
understanding of congressional purpose or intent. The added deference could
inform the Chevron Step One inquiry regarding statutory ambiguity. The

should not be revisited as the informal agency (and OMB) processes that have developed to function
around the formal Circular A-19 processes work efficiently; formal modification by OMB would
likely only disrupt an informal system that seems to be functioning quite well.”).
242 See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text (discussing and citing relevant literature).
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reviewing court would then also defer to any reasonable agency interpretation
of the statute at Chevron Step Two. Such a double deference standard would
depart from the Court’s current Chevron doctrine approach, and in the process
would provide even more incentives for agencies to self-deal while legislating
in the shadows.243
To properly recalibrate agency statutory interpretation in light of agency
legislating in the shadows, it might make the most sense to allow agencies to
engage in more purposivist statutory interpretation, yet to review such
interpretations for Skidmore weight instead of Chevron space. Indeed, there
are striking similarities between purposivism and Skidmore: Both encourage the
agency to produce and analyze evidence of statutory purpose or intent—evidence
about which agencies may have comparative expertise over courts.244 Both
place greater weight on whether a particular interpretation furthers the objectives
of the statute, focusing more on the intended effect or substance of the statute
than just its plain text or form.245
Adopting the Chief Justice’s context-specific approach to Chevron deference,
by contrast, would not eliminate the risk of double deference (assuming the
Court also allows for a more purposivist approach). But this narrowing of
Chevron to examine whether the collective Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency as to the particular provision would
arguably reduce much of the costs associated with legislating in the shadows.
Federal agencies would continue to provide confidential technical drafting
assistance to encourage congressional drafters to leverage agency expertise,
but agencies would have fewer incentives for self-dealing in the absence of a
more bright-line Chevron deference doctrine.

243 This double deference point is reminiscent of Justice Stevens’s “double reasonableness”
observation regarding qualified immunity in the Fourth Amendment context. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s decision to
“approve a double standard of reasonableness—the constitutional standard already embodied in the
Fourth Amendment and an even more generous standard that protects any officer who reasonably could
have believed that his conduct was constitutionally reasonable”); accord Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
214 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“Double counting ‘objective reasonableness,’ the
Court appears to suggest, is demanded by Anderson, which twice restated that qualified immunity
shields the conduct of officialdom ‘across the board.’” (internal citation omitted)).
244 Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a
fair understanding of the legislative plan.”).
245 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 136, at 35-39 (arguing that the Chief Justice’s contextualist
approach to interpretation in King v. Burwell and NFIB v. Sebelius favors the statute’s substance over
its textual form).
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CONCLUSION
As documented in this Article, federal agencies play a substantial role in
the legislative process—both in the foreground by drafting the substantive
legislation the Administration desires to submit to Congress and in the
shadows by providing confidential technical drafting assistance on legislation
that originates from congressional staffers. The latter type of statutory drafting
is of vital importance to the legislative process, as it leverages the agency’s
expertise and vast regulatory experience in the subject matter to improve the
legislative output. Accordingly, the Administrative Conference of the United
States has wisely recommended that “[c]ongressional committees and individual
Members should aim to reach out to agencies for technical assistance early in
the legislative drafting process” and that “[f]ederal agencies should endeavor
to provide Congress with technical drafting assistance when asked.”246
Legislating in the shadows, however, is not without costs. It can provide
incentives for a federal agency and member(s) of Congress to collude to
expand the agency’s regulatory authority by leaving ambiguities in proposed
legislation to be later interpreted by the agency—in ways that may be
contrary to the wishes of the collective Congress. Such administrative
collusion allows the federal agency to impermissibly be both the law-maker
and the law-interpreter. Indeed, one recurring theme from the agency
interviews conducted for this study is that federal agency officials often
provide technical drafting assistance that keeps the proposed statutory
language broad and flexible in order to preserve (or perhaps expand) the
scope of the agency’s regulatory authority.
It is safe to assume that the Chevron Court did not consider this phenomenon
when it crystalized the doctrine that a court should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency administers.
Nor did Justice Scalia when he reiterated a broad, bright-line Chevron approach
in City of Arlington, much less when he expressed concerns with Auer deference
yet dismissed similar concerns with Chevron deference. Appreciating the
expansive role of federal agencies in the legislative process should encourage
rethinking of how courts review agency statutory interpretations.
For some on the federal bench, in Congress, and in the legal academy, that
may well mean abandoning Chevron deference in favor of the less-deferential
Skidmore standard. For others, it may encourage a more limited, context-specific
Chevron doctrine, similar to the approach the Chief Justice embraced in his
dissent in City of Arlington and his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.
Yet for others, this phenomenon may well just reinforce their current view that
courts should grant great deference (indeed, perhaps double deference) to
246

Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015).

2017]

Legislating in the Shadows

1433

agency statutory interpretations because of the agency’s deep understanding
of its statutory mandate and vast experience and expertise in the subject
matter. In all events, this Article only begins the conversation about the role
of federal agencies in the legislative process. Much more empirical and
theoretical work needs to be done.
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